Denver Law Review
Volume 88
Issue 4 Special Issue - Class and American
Legal Education

Article 14

January 2011

Listening to the Debate on Reforming Law School Admissions
Preferences
Richard H. Sander

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
Richard H. Sander, Listening to the Debate on Reforming Law School Admissions Preferences, 88 Denv. U.
L. Rev. 889 (2011).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

LISTENING TO THE DEBATE
ON REFORMING LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS PREFERENCES
RICHARD H. SANDERt
PART I. SOME FURTHER NOTES COMPARING RACE AND CLASS ......... 891
....... 891
Prelude: A Time for Reassessment ......
A.
..... 897
Discrimination and Outcomes ...........
B.
............ 906
...........
Viewpoint Diversity.
C.
PART II. STEPS TOWARD REFORM INLAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS.......909
909
A Tentative Proposal.......... ................
A.
...................... 914
Consensus Approach
B.
. . . . . 918
Is Class Diversity Feasible? . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C.
..... 923
PART III. RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC CRITIQUES ...........
.................. 923
Methodological Issues ....
A.
......... 927
On the Visibility of Class...........
B.
Knocking Down a Few Over-the-Top Claims ........... 930
C.
....... 933
PART IV. REVISITING THE "MISMATCH" DEBATE .......
.......... 937
The Conceptual Demonstration.......
A.
The Simple Empiricism of Comparing Law Schools. 938
B.
Demonstration through Statistical Anal. BPS Data.... 944
C.
952
.................................
PART V. CONCLUSION
The debate over affirmative action in higher education has entered a
new era. For decades the argument was largely ideological, between
those who thought racial preferences were intrinsically a betrayal of the
color-blind ideals of the civil rights movement, and those who believed
that a sudden shift from Jim Crow to official color-blindness would leave
the upper reaches of America segregated and impervious to change. In
sharp contrast, the emerging debate is empirical and pragmatic. Few proponents of affirmative action believe it should go on indefinitely; most
proponents acknowledge that preferences carry with them some undesirable side-effects. Few of those who oppose racial preferences are really
comfortable with the idea of minority numbers dwindling towards zero at
any elite institution. These are circumstances in which it is possible for
angry debate to evolve into discussion, where empirical findings matter
and where policy alternatives can be candidly compared. Under such
hopeful conditions, the premium on combat skills declines and the value
of listening goes up.
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My opening piece in this symposium, Class in American Legal
Education' (hereinafter CALE) argued that the institutional quest for "diversity" in American law schools has produced quite substantial racial
diversity but very little socioeconomic diversity, and that most law
schools follow a double standard, using very large preferences to compete for the pool of affluent minority candidates, while creating substantial barriers to students from poor, working class or even "middle class"
backgrounds.2 My hope was to provide enough data, in enough forms, to
make many of the empirical claims transparent and provide the tools for
readers to draw their own conclusions.
The eleven commentators, in their ten response essays, have done
just that, providing varied and often insightful perspectives on how law
schools should take account of "class." Many good questions are raised,
along with some thoughtful answers. Some of the contributors agree with
and expand upon the central points in CALE. Others agree with some
reservations. About half of the contributors are concerned (mistakenly)
that my essay is really a Trojan horse for ending racial preferences.
Nearly all the contributors, however, agree that the absence of socioeconomic diversity in American law schools has been too long overlooked,
and are willing to consider seriously steps to reform current preference
systems. Nearly everyone also put forth ideas that should undoubtedly be
part of the reform mix. That is a very good start. In this reply essay, I try
to synthesize many of these ideas into a specific proposal for the reform
of preferences systems, and show how the various contributors' ideas fit
together. There are in some cases deep differences and incompatibilities
among the essayists here (see Parts III and IV of this essay if you doubt
that), but beneath the rhetoric there is also a lot of common ground.
I have four goals in this essay-which thus has four parts. In Part I,
I provide some background helpful in thinking about the most common
critique of CALE: that addressing "class" diversity should be completely
divorced from discussions of racial diversity and existing race preference
systems. I see instead a natural evolution where we learn from the successes and problems of race preferences, and reform preference systems
to better achieve the underlying goals of diversity, social mobility, and
fairness. The three sections of Part I each illustrate a different aspect of
this theme.
In Part II, I advance a specific proposal for reforming law school
preference and financial aid systems, and then consider the ways in
which the proposal captures-or at least attempts to capture-the key
values and ideas of each contributor. At the end of Part II, I present data
that addresses the "feasibility" question-in particular, whether there are
1. Richard H. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENv. U. L. REv. 631 (2011)
[hereinafter CALE].
2. See generally id.
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enough promising students from low-SES backgrounds to make law
school SES diversity possible.
Part III responds to specific criticisms advanced by the symposium
participants. And Part IV takes up the state of the law school "mismatch"
debate, and why the evidence for mismatch provides in itself a sufficient,
though not necessary, basis for supporting the types of preference reforms outlined in Part II.
PART I.

SOME FURTHER NOTES COMPARING RACE AND CLASS

Most of the participants in this symposium agree that "class" should
be more central to law school diversity efforts. A central disagreement
concerns how such efforts should co-exist with racial preferences. Part II
offers an answer to this question, but Part I prepares the ground. First, I
discuss recent work by two very thoughtful black writers who have distinct but complementary takes on how the meaning of race is changing in
contemporary America. Then I critically examine the two most common
justifications for giving "race" preeminence in law school affirmative
action: the "discrimination" argument and the "viewpoint diversity" argument. In both cases, recent research and the added perspective of
"class" are helpful in thinking about these issues afresh.
A. Prelude: A Time for Reassessment
Academics can sometimes be quite insular, especially in specific
fields that can lose touch with real-world trends and developments. Over
the past sixteen years or so-since the mid-1990s when modern challenges to affirmative action began with Hopwood v. Texas and Proposition 209-many in higher education have focused on defending the
status quo, and when unconstrained by outside rules, their rules have
tended to either be static or to have moved in the direction of further solidifying the status quo.4 In the meantime, however, the world that
American minorities face has changed substantially, even dramatically.
Many thoughtful observers outside the academy see this change plainly.
In this section, I want to provide some sense of this new perspective.
A particularly thoughtful contribution, touching on many of the
themes of this symposium, is Eugene Robinson's recent book Disintegration: the Splintering of Black America.s Robinson is one of the nation's leading black journalists; his reporting and commentary for the
Washington Post won a Pulitzer Prize in 2009. In his book, Robinson
3. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
4.
For example, in the years since the Supreme Court's holding in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003), law school racial preferences have become larger and even more mechanical than
before. Richard H. Sander, Why Strict Scrutiny Requires Transparency: The PracticalEffects of
Bakke, Gratz, and Grutter, in NEW DIRECTION IN JUDICIAL POLITICS (Kevin McGuire, ed., forthcoming 2012).
5.

EUGENE ROBINSON, DISINTEGRATION: THE SPLINTERING OF BLACK AMERICA (2010).
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insightfully analyzes the emergence, over the past generation, of four
distinct black communities in the United States.6 "Mainstream" blacks
are those in the middle- and upper-middle class, a group that has, as
Robinson documents, expanded dramatically since the Civil Rights revolution. 7 "The Emergent" include both black immigrants, the children of
those immigrants, and interracial blacks, groups who together now constitute over twenty percent of the nation's black population.8 Immigrant
blacks tend to arrive with strong educational credentials-the strongest,
according to Robinson, of any immigrant group9-and see America not
as a land of discrimination, but as a land of opportunity (hence their decision to immigrate). Interracial blacks often similarly see race through a
non-traditional prism-a matter of choice rather than inescapable identity.o "The Transcendent" are the black elite, who are not only extraordinary achievers in their own right, but also enjoy a special glow from
their racial identity." Oprah Winfrey, Tiger Woods, Morgan Freeman,
and of course Barack Obama are all Americans of remarkable talent, but
they also enjoy a special reverence that is connected to their racial identity.
This leaves "the Abandoned"-the half of the black population that
remains intensely isolated in urban ghettos or the rural South, that has
extraordinarily high poverty rates, where unemployment is pervasive,
incarceration is common and stable two-parent families are the exception.12 Robinson argues that the rise of the other three black Americas
has intensified the plight of the Abandoned in several ways. The development of fair housing policies made it possible for Mainstream blacks
to leave core ghettos, leaving those communities populated by the Abandoned, sans the middle-class amenities, stores, and institutions that gave
many mid-century ghettos considerable vibrancy.13 Some conservatives
point to the three successful black Americas as a rationale for ignoring
the fourth, blaming its problems on internal pathologies. Many Mainstream blacks do not share the identity of interests with the Abandoned
they once did, so the latter group has lost some of its most important
advocates and spokesmen. And white liberals are likely to be more comfortable with easy policy measures that help the Mainstream than with
6. See generally id.
7. See generally id.
8. See generally id.
9. Seeid.at165-66.
10. See id.at 179-90. Americans self-identifying as multiracial numbered 3.9 million in 2000,
and 5.3 million in 2009, thus growing at four times the rate of the United States population as a
whole, and growing faster in proportionate terms than any other racial group. UNITED STATES
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 10 tbl.6 (2011).

I1. See ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 139-62.
12. Id. at 107-38.
13. These ideas were earlier developed by William Julius Wilson in THE TRULY
DISADVANTAGED (1987), and are empirically investigated and elaborated in Yana Kucheva & Richard H. Sander, The Misunderstood Consequences of Shelley v. Kramer, (July 16, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
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the much harder work of tackling the tough problems that dominate the
world of the Abandoned.
Robinson was not aware of the research in CALE when he wrote his
book, but my findings illustrate his thesis. The benefits of law school
affirmative action policies flow overwhelmingly to upper-middle class
blacks, and disproportionately to the Emergent. The rhetoric of legal
educators suggests that affirmative action seeks to help the Abandoned
into the mainstream, but the actual representation of poor and workingclass blacks is miniscule, and law school policies tend to aggravate this
bias rather than counter it.
Interestingly, even though Robinson's empirical focus is not on racial preferences (he focuses on general patterns of social life, mobility,
and employment, not on higher education), he recognizes that reforming
affirmative action is an important part of any strategy to address the
plight of the Abandoned.' 4 He suggests that there are three key steps towards a progressive strategy.'" The first is to recognize that the problems
of the Abandoned are distinct and of a greater order of magnitude than
those affecting other blacks. The second is to pursue large-scale initiatives that are focused, not on race itself, but on the problems that the
Abandoned experience in disproportionate numbers, such as industrial
unemployment, inner-city decay, and inadequate education. (Robinson
commends Obama for taking significant steps along these lines; Obama
has characterized and shaped many of his most important initiatives in
race-neutral terms even though they are targeted at key problems facing
the Abandoned. 16) The third is to make a key gesture to the concerns of
many Americans that racial preference programs have evolved into a
poorly-targeted, special interest boondoggle:
Obama has an important card that he can play: means-testing of affirmative action programs. He can declare that from now on, the
black Mainstream should be on its own-in exchange for the political
leeway to concentrate money and attention on the Abandoned. ...
[For this to work he] would need support ... from other black leaders
and opinion-makers-from members of the Congressional Black
Caucus, for example, as well as big-city mayors, the major civil
rights organizations, and other important actors. For African17
American officeholders, this would require considerable courage... .
CALE provides a lot of empirical support for the intuition behind
Robinson's policy recommendations on affirmative action. Traditional
preference programs are increasingly out-of-kilter with the social reality
on the ground. Not only does this lead to neglect of those most disadvan14.
15.
16.
17.

ROBINSON, supra note 5, at at 208-14.

See generally id. at 191-221.
Id. at 217-19.
Id. at 219.
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taged, it also exacts a significant and growing political price because the
policies have shrinking legitimacy in most people's eyes.
Another fascinating reassessment of the American racial scene has
come recently from Ellis Cose, a black journalist and social observer best
known for his 1993 book The Rage of a Privileged Class.18 In Rage,
Cose examined in detail a seeming paradox: while a growing number of
blacks were, by the early 1990s, successful and even "privileged," they
still felt surrounded by subtle and less-than-subtle indicators of continued
racism and discrimination, small bars so pervasive that many felt almost
as though they were in caged exhibits intended to show off America's
willingness to tolerate them. 19 In his new book, The End of Anger, 20
Cose documents a dramatic evolution over the past two decades. "Few
people of any race would claim that full racial equality has arrived in
America," he writes.
Still, so much has changed since Rage was published. It's not that
discrimination has stopped or that racist assumptions have vanished.
But they are not nearly as powerful as they once were. Color is becoming less and less a burden; race is less and less an immovable
barrier. Some forty-four percent of blacks now claim to believe that
blacks and whites have an equal opportunity of getting ahead-compared to thirty percent twelve years ago .... And in the lifting of
that oppressive weight, many blacks have finally felt free to breathe-and to believe.21
Cose reports some astonishing shifts in black attitudes. In 2009,
69% of blacks agreed with the statement that Martin Luther King's vision of a racially just America had been fulfilled. In 2010, in the midst of
a deepening recession, a CBS poll found that nearly half of all blacks
said they thought America's next generation would be better off than
those living today (compared to only 16% of whites).22 A majority of the
corporate and professional blacks Cose interviewed thought they were on
an equal footing in their workplace with their white peers, and nearly as
many believed there was no racial glass ceiling at their workplace. His
interviewees recurringly see "a world in which race seriously affects
opportunities for blacks and Hispanics, but (and this is a crucial 'but')
not strongly enough to prevent them from getting where they want to
23
go."

ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS: WHY ARE MIDDLE-CLASS BLACKS
18.
ANGRY? (1993).

19.

See generally id.

ELLIS COSE, THE END OF ANGER: A NEw GENERATION'S TAKE ON RACE AND RAGE
20.
(2011) [herinafter THE END OF ANGER].

21.
22.

Id. at 8.
Id. at 3.

23.

Id. at 12.
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Although Cose does not cite Robinson, and though The End of Anger is quite a different book from Disintegration,the resonance of certain
themes is unmistakable. Cose's interviewees redound in the celebration
of successes among the black middle class, but they also express great
alarm over the ground being lost by poor and working-class blacks
(Robinson's "Abandoned"). As one black Harvard MBA observes,
I am much more optimistic about the future of my children than I am
about the future of all black children, two-thirds of whom are born in
poverty.. . . I think the opportunities are being made [available] to a
smaller and smaller population of blacks and that our lower class is
growing and becoming more permanent. 24
Others perceive a broader social divide increasingly defined by
class and economic inequality rather than race.
Cose does not embrace specific policy strategies, but near the end of
his book he writes,
One of the most clear-headed thinkers I know in the field of social
policy is john powell, director of Ohio State University's Kirwan Institute. He believes fervently that the time is ripe for a new social vision, that the old language of opportunity and inequality, so much of
which is narrowly focused on race, needs to become significantly
broader. A new movement for social justice, as he sees it, would recognize the broad nature of America's unfinished business and bring

various groups together in the embrace of what he calls "targeted
universalism."
As an example, he offered the following:
Some people invited me to talk about health care. [And] I started out
by saying, 'How many of you know a relative, friend, family member, who doesn't have insurance?' About half the people raise their
hands. 'How many people do you know who have lost their insurance
because they have a serious illness?' Within two questions or three
questions, you get everybody .... And I said, 'We should do something about this. This problem that affects your community, affects
your family, actually affects the black and Latino community even
more so.' At that point, nobody walks away. So now the black and
Latino community is in the conversation, but it's in the conversation
in a way that they can empathize with. What we often do-and this is
why we shouldn't start with just disparities-is that we say, 'there's
this huge gap between blacks and whites, and we need to fix it.'
Well, if I'm talking to a white audience and that's the start of my
25
conversation, they're not in the conversation.

24.
25.

Id. at 23.
Id. at 281-82.
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I don't know whether either powell or Cose have applied this logic
to affirmative action policies, but as Robinson points out, the logic fits
particularly well on that issue.
As a third example of emerging views among left-of-center intellectuals concerned with issues of inequality, consider the types of stories
that have recently cropped up in The New York Times and The Washington Post. Several times in the past year, the Times has run stories on the
increasingly multi-racial character of America, and the seeming obsolescence of traditional racial categories. A particular pertinent example of
this coverage came on the front-page of the June 14, 2011 Times:
At the beginning of the college application season last fall, Natasha
Scott, a high school senior of mixed racial heritage in Beltsville, Md.,
vented about a personal dilemma on College Confidential, the go-to
electronic bulletin board for anonymous conversation about admissions. 'I just realized that my race is something I have to think
about,' she wrote, describing herself as having an Asian mother and a
black father. 'It pains me to say this, but putting down black might
help my admissions chances and putting down Asian might hurt it.
My mother urges me to put down black to use AA to get in to the colleges I'm applying to . .. I sort of want to do this but I'm wondering

if this is morally right.' Within minutes, a commenter had responded, 'You're black. You should own it.' Someone else agreed,
'Put black!!!!!!! Listen to your mom.' 26
While the fellow students writing comments on College Confidential may not have appreciated Natasha's moral dilemma, the two reporters of the story certainly did, and so will most Times readers. They will
also internalize this and other fresh evidence of a morally-wayward preference system. A few weeks earlier, the Times's newest Pulitzer-Prizewinning columnist, David Leonhart, wrote another prominent article, this
one dealing with the failure of most American colleges to achieve even a
semblance of socioeconomic diversity.27 Meanwhile, the Washington
Post reported on a poll the Post conducted with the Kaiser Family Foundation, which found that both black and white residents of the District of
Columbia see, by large margins, "income" rather than "race" as the critical divide in the city-a remarkable change in what was long regarded as
one of America's most racially polarized cities.28
These varied sources suggest that the world-views of people thinking about race and inequality in America are undergoing significant
26. Susan Saulny & Jacques Steinberg, On College Forms, a Question Of Race, or Races,
Can Perplex, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2011, at Al.
27. David Leonhart, Top Colleges, Largelyfor the Elite, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2011, at Bl.
28. Chris L. Jenkins, Theola Labbe-DeBose & Peyton M. Craighill, Class, Not Race, a Divider For Many
in D.C.,
WASH.
POST,
Jun.
19,
2011,
available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-residents-see-class-not-race-as-citys-greatdivider/2011/06/17/AGZdU9bHstory.html.
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change. In particular, black intellectuals who are spending time talking to
people outside academia have observed a striking evolution in America's
racial scene and a growing urgency to address the problems of lowincome minorities in a broader context of addressing the exclusion of
low-income Americans from the mainstream of American life. The idea
of rethinking traditional affirmative action policies, in light of the findings in CALE, is therefore of something more than passing interest; it is,
rather, particularly timely because it goes to the heart of social and attitudinal changes in contemporary America.
B. Discriminationand Outcomes
There is no question that racial discrimination continues to be a
common event in America. For some symposium contributors, the existence of racial discrimination is in itself a sufficient justification for not
even touching the subject of racial preferences in law school. The logic
goes something like this: "If racial discrimination exists, all minorities
are substantively and seriously injured. Preference programs help to offset these injuries, and directly combat discrimination." This sort of reasoning has been repeated so often as to take on the aura of an incantation.
Let us scrutinize the argument a bit.
Consider, first, the observation quoted earlier from Ellis Cose's
work: "race seriously affects opportunities for blacks and Hispanics, but
(and this is a crucial 'but') not strongly enough to prevent them from
getting where they want to go." 29 A more analytic way of putting this
point is that individual acts of discrimination may increase search costs
without necessarily, or even materially, affecting final outcomes. If, for
example, a black job applicant has a 20% chance of encountering racial
discrimination, that does not mean that she will have 20% lower earnings, or 20% less employment; it means that she will need to submit 20%
more job applications, on average, to achieve the same results as a white
job applicant.
This insight helps us understand findings from the social science literature. The Urban Institute conducted perhaps the most famous of the
job market "audit" studies in the early 1990s. Ten pairs of carefullytrained "testers" (with one black and one white tester in each pair) applied for hundreds of jobs advertised in Chicago and Washington, D.C..
Out of 438 completed audits, 62 produced job offers for both testers, 65
produced offers only for the white tester, and 23 produced offers for only
the black tester.o (The other 288 audits produced offers for neither
tester.) A way of summarizing these results is that out of every ten
29.
See COSE, THE END OF ANGER, supra note 20, at 12.
30.
MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER, MICHAEL E. Fix & RAYMOND J. STRUYK, URBAN
INSTITUTE, OPPORTUNITIES DENIED, OPPORTUNITIES DIMINISHED: RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN
HIRING (1991).
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searches, the white tester received 2.9 job offers, while the black tester
received 1.9 offers. Another very well-known study that appeared about
the same time, by economist June O'Neill, found that when one controlled for human capital qualities (something very few -labor market
studies do), the "earnings differential" between black and white workers
virtually disappeared. 3 ' These findings are not incompatible: the presence
of some job discrimination implies higher search costs for blacks, but not
necessarily lower earnings. 32
Of course, discrimination in itself is an evil to be combated. For me
that is not merely a moral sentiment; I have spent a good deal of my
working life fighting discrimination, and I believe I have done a lot to
increase the enforcement of fair housing laws. My general point is that
we often extrapolate from evidence of discrimination to other conclusions that are not necessarily justified.
Discourses on discrimination tend to focus on racialdiscrimination.
In fact, the tendency of people to make fine distinctions about "others"
and extend accordingly differential treatment is extraordinarily pervasive. This is particularly well-illustrated in a recent study that examined
how people react to the brands of clothing others wear. 3 The researchers
found that a woman asking strangers to participate in a survey had four
times the response rate when she wore a Tommy Hilfiger sweater as
when she wore an identical sweater with no label. Volunteers who went
door-to-door seeking charitable contributions raised nearly twice as
much when they wore shirts with designer logos as when they wore identical shirts with no logo. 34
"Fashion" discrimination may seem relatively benign; we are not
tied to our clothes, thank goodness-though fashion certainly correlates
31.
June O'Neill, The Role of Human Capital in Earnings Diferences Between Black and
White Men, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 25 (1990). O'Neill observes, "The black-white hourly earnings ratio
is 82.9 percent before adjusting for any characteristics . . . after adjusting for region, schooling and
potential work experience . . . the ratio rises to 87.7 percent. The addition of the AFQT raises the
ratio to 95.5 percent, at which point close to three-quarters of the gap is explained. Adding actual
work experience virtually closes the gap." Id. at 40.
32. Note that perhaps the most in-depth study of racial discrimination patterns ever conducted-the National Housing Discrimination Study of 2000 conducted by The Urban Institute,
found very low levels of net discrimination. See generally THE URBAN INSTITUTE, THE HOUSING
DISCRIMINATION STUDY 2000 HDS (2000). See The "net" rate of discrimination experienced by
blacks seeking to establish the availability of rental housing was about 4%; the net rate of "segregation" steering by real estate agents towards black testers was also about 4%. In other, more subtle or
subjective aspects of housing search, net discrimination rates are higher, but the general pattern is
one of astonishing progress, even relative to the prior national discrimination audit studies of 1989.
See MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER, STEPHEN L. Ross, GEORGE C. GALSTER & JOHN YINGER, THE
URBAN INSTITUTE, DISCRIMINATION IN METROPOLITAN HOUSING MARKETS: NATIONAL RESULTS
FROM PHASE I HDS 2000 3-2, 6-7 (2002).

33.
Rob M.A. Nelissen & Marijn H.C. Meijersa, Social Benefits ofLuxury Brands as Costly
Signals of Wealth and Status, 32 J. EVO. & HUM. BEH. 343 (2011).
34. One defect in this study is that it was not "double-blind"-that is, the people seeking
donations or survey participants presumably knew whether they were wearing a logo, and that may
have influenced their behavior in subtle ways.
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with socioeconomic status, and the logo study buttresses Eli Wald's argument that class is "visible" and has effects in daily interactions. But
there are many in-born characteristics, unrelated to race, that are associated with widespread discrimination. In recent years, social scientists
have shown that labor market outcomes are strongly associated with the
height,3 6 weight,3 and physical attractiveness of individuals. The patterns vary some across groups-being tall seems to matter somewhat
more for males, and being slender matters more for women (of all
ages)-but the associated wage differences are large. There is still a good
deal of debate over the nature of the causal link-partly because largescale audit studies have tended to focus on factors like gender and race,
and neglect these other variations-but there is considerable evidence
that a significant part of the earnings differential is due to discrimination.39 I suspect that most readers can think of situations where the
height, weight, and attractiveness of others have affected their own behavior, even in relatively formal circumstances.
Since discrimination based on physical characteristics is linked to
lower earnings, it is reasonable to infer that it is sufficiently pervasive so
as to not be easily avoided by longer and more intensive searches. Discrimination in this realm is plausibly associated with worse personal outcomes; a short man may experience discrimination so pervasive that it
directly reduces his life chances. For blacks and Hispanics growing up in
affluent circumstances, it is much more doubtful that such discrimination
as they experience is sufficient to substantively affect their long-term
outcomes. Studies of college graduates based on cohorts after 1990, if
they control for such human capital factors as school eliteness, test
scores, and college grades, not only do not show earnings deficits for

35.
See Eli Wald, The Visibility ofSocioeconomic Status and Class-BasedAffirmative Action:
A Reply to ProfessorSander,88 DENV. U. L. REV. 861, 865 (2011).
36. Timothy A. Judge & Daniel M. Cable, The Effect of Physical Height on Workplace Success and Income: PreliminaryTest ofa Theoretical Model, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 428 (2004). Note,
however, that some commentators think that at least part of the difference in height outcomes is
attributable to differences in cognitive ability, and others think that height effects are mediated by
adolescent experiences related to height. See N. Persico, A. Postlewaite & D. Silverman, The Effect
ofAdolescent Experience on Labor Market Outcomes: The Case ofHeight, 112 J. POL. EcoN. 1019
(2004); Anne Case & Christina Paxson, Stature and Status: Height, Ability, and Labor Market
Outcomes, 116 J. POL. ECoN. 499 (2008).
37.
John Cawley, The Impact ofObesity on Wages, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCES 2 (2004); Dalton
Conley & Rebecca Glauber, Gender, Body Mass, and Socioeconomic Status: New Evidencefrom the
PSID, 17 ADVANCES INHEALTH ECON. & HEALTH SERVS. RES. 253 (2007).
38.
Daniel S. Hammermesh & Jeff E. Biddle, Beauty and the Labor Market, 84 AMER. ECON.
REV. 1174 (1994); Markus Mobius & Tanya Rosenblat, Why Beauty Matters,96 AMER. ECON. REV.
222 (2006).
39. See Mobius & Rosenblat, supra note 38, for experimental evidence on the causal role of
physical attractiveness.

900

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:4

blacks and Hispanics; instead, they tend to show earnings advantages,
especially for blacks.40
Thus, if preferences are meant to counterbalance societal discrimination, then current preferences are very poorly calibrated.
Where is the evidence that contemporary, well-educated blacks suffer
more consequential discrimination than those with socially disfavored
flavors of height, weight and beauty? I have no doubt that race imposes very substantial burdens when it interacts with low SES and
limited educational opportunity. But if so, we should be focusing not
on race alone, but on the intersection of race and class.
Table 1, below, is helpful in getting a sense of the relative role that
education and race play in determining earnings levels in contemporary
America.
Table 1
Median Family Income by Race and Education of Household Head
Married Couples with Heads from 35-44 Years Old, 2009
Education of

Asian

Black

Hispanic

household head

Less than high
school diploma
High School
Bachelor degree
Graduate degree

Non-Hispanic
Whites

$36,000

$35,200

$37,000

$46,600

$50,000
$102,000
1 $130,000

$52,030
$95,000
$110,000

$49,000
$88,300
$114,000

$66,000
$108,500
$129,000

,

Source: Author's calculations from the 2009 American Community
Survey
This table reveals several interesting things. Most obviously, educational levels matter enormously in determining earnings, at least for
families whose primary earner is approaching his or her peak earning
years. Families headed by someone with a bachelor's degree earn from
more than two to almost three times as much as families headed by
someone who has not completed high school. Indeed, looking at this
table it is hard to avoid the conclusion that education dwarfs race as a
determinant of earnings. It is also important to note that black/white and
Hispanic/white income differences decline with greater education: the
black family income "deficit", relative to whites, is 24.5% for high
school dropouts; 21.2% for high school graduates; and 12.4% for college
graduates. The gap widens again a bit (to 14.7%) for those with graduate
degrees, but this plausibly is due to mismatch effects, which are more
pervasive at the graduate school level than at the bachelor's level, and
work to systematically lower the earnings of minorities with graduate
40.

For one particularly relevant example, see Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of

Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 463-64 (2004) (hereinafter
Systematic Analysis], and accompanying text.
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degrees. 4 1 (Consider, for example, the vast numbers of blacks who complete law school-a graduate degree-but never pass the bar.4 2 ) Indeed,
it is more than plausible that if one better controlled for human capital
characteristics, such as grades, professional certifications, work history,
and schools attended, the analysis would show no black-white or Hispanic-white deficit in the bottom two rows of Table 1.43
It follows that educational attainment is an incomparably more important determinant of affluence than is race. And, as one could infer
from the analyses in CALE, socioeconomic background is a more important determinant of one's educational attainment than is race. To show
this point more directly, consider Table 2, which shows (for a cohort of
twelve thousand students who would be, if they completed high school,
in the class of 1992) educational attainments for high-SES blacks, compared with low-SES blacks and low-SES whites.
Table 2
Rates of Attaining Particular Educational Outcomes
by SES Quartile and Race Among Participants in the National Educational Longitudinal Survey, 1988-2000
Outcome
Attain a bachelor's degree
Complete a graduate

Percent ofBlacks in each SES
group with the given outcome:
Bottom Quartile
Top Quartile
41%

Whites in theBottom SES Quartile
with the given
otcoe:

outcome:

6%

6%

5.5%

0.2%

0.4%

7%

0%

0.2%

1 in 30

1 in 12

degree

Attended an elite college
Proportion of bachelor
recipients who obtain

1 in 7 or8

graduate degree by age 26

Source: Author's calculations from NELS database
There is another, perhaps even more forceful, way of grasping this
point. If one examines any of the large, longitudinal databases of teenagers and young adults created during the past twenty years, and asks what
factors strongly predict college attendance, controlling for student background, test scores, academic preparation, and other relevant factors, one
41.
Richard H. Sander, The Racial Paradox of the Corporate Law Firm, 84 N.C. L. REV.
1755 (2006); Sander, supra note 40, 456-68 (2004); Linda Loury & David Garman, College Selectivity andEarnings, 13 J. LAB. ECON. 289 (1995).
42. See Jane Yakowitz, Marooned: An Empirical Investigation of Law School Graduates Who
Failthe Bar Exam, 60 J. LEG. EDUC. 3 (2010).
43.
Differences in black and white incomes often appear much starker when one does not
control for family composition, but it is important to do so, since the issue here is how human capital
is rewarded in the labor market. The reasons for the very large proportion of unmarried blacks are
undoubtedly complex, ranging from the high incarceration rates of black men to the attitudes of
black women towards interracial marriage. See RALPH RICHARD BANKS, IS MARRIAGE FOR WHITE
PEOPLE? HOW THE AFRICAN AMERICAN MARRIAGE DECLINE AFFECTS EVERYONE (2011).
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will find that being black is a strong positive predictor while low-SES is
a strong negative predictor. As best we can tell, black high school
graduates are about 30% more likely than comparable whites to attend
college, while high school graduates in the bottom SES quintile are about
80% less likely to attend college than high school graduates from the top
SES quintile.4
In sum, I think the social science evidence is consistent with the
more casual empiricism of Eugene Robinson and Ellis Cose: affluent
blacks, and the children raised in those families, are doing pretty well.
They may encounter occasional discrimination, but it is hard to show that
this translates, for them, into worse outcomes in their lives. Disadvantages they may experience are not in the same league as those facing
low- and moderate-SES families and their children.
Recall that I launched on this discussion to evaluate the following
argument: "If racial discrimination exists, all minorities are substantively
and seriously injured. Preference programs help to offset these injuries,
and directly combat discrimination." For the reasons outlined in this section, I think the first statement is incorrect: affluent minorities may encounter discrimination, but it is doubtful that this has a material effect on
their economic and professional life outcomes. Now consider the second
claim, that preference programs combat discrimination.
Set aside for the moment the mismatch issue (though only for a
moment-I revisit mismatch in some detail in Part IV). Set aside even
the growing evidence that artificially boosting students into more elite
schools hurts, rather than helps, their long-term earnings.45 Consider the
simple logic of the idea that systematic and very large racial preferences
effectively combat racial stereotypes and discrimination.
My finding in Systemic Analysis,4 that large preferences generally
translate into poor academic performance, remains undisputed by the
critics. The finding has been duplicated by other recent research in law
schools and higher education generally.4 7 With the current scale of preferences at elite colleges and professional schools, about half of blacks
end up in the bottom ten percent of the class; about half of Hispanics end
up in the bottom twenty percent of the class. Particularly in law school,
44. Jay D. Teachman, Kathleen M. Paasch, Randal D. Day & Karen P. Carver, Poverty During Adolescence and Subsequent Educational Achievement, in CONSEQUENCES OF GROWING UP
POOR 382-418 (Duncan & Brooks-Gunn, eds., 1997), and author's analysis of data from the National Educational Longitudinal Study.
45. Richard H. Sander & Jane Yakowitz, The Secret ofMy Success: How Status, Prestige,and
School PerformanceShape Legal Careers,J. EMP. LEGAL STUDIES (forthcoming 2011). This article
substantially elaborates on my earlier work on the interaction of law school grades and school eliteness on post-law-school earnings.
46. Sander, supra note 40, at 425-36.
47. See Peter Arcidiacono et al., What Happens After Enrollment? An Analysis of the Time
Path of Racial Differences in GPA and Major Choice, (Duke University, Working Paper, 2011).
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these performance deficits are not meaningfully due to anything other
than preferences; that is, performance improves in direct proportion to
the reduction in preferences. 48
Probably the most pernicious stereotypes about African-Americans
have to do with intellectual capacity and work ethic. 4 9 As a method of
combating these stereotypes, it is hard to imagine a worse policy than
deliberately putting blacks into graduate-level classrooms in which they
are at an enormous competitive disadvantage. The students (including the
beneficiaries themselves) are not entirely aware that large preferences are
at work. If minority students disproportionately end up with the worst
grades in the class, how can this not be reflected in perceptions of classroom performance? Even though black first-year law students tend, if
anything, to spend more hours on their homework than do their white
counterparts, will they not seem disproportionately unprepared when
called upon in class? Will they not disproportionately ask questions that
suggest they do not get the point of the case under discussion, and will
they not be perceived as more likely to detour class discussion in to repetitive explanations of the obvious? And, when the shock of firstsemester grades undermines the morale and engagement of minority law
students, will these effects not simply be intensified?
One of the saddest aspects of the diversity debate is the utter failure
of the diversity lobby to seriously confront this issue-or for that matter,
to even acknowledge that the issue exists. Advocates instead ignore, underplay, or gloss over the grade gap.50 This is even odder given the
emergence of "stereotype threat" as a common explanation of poor mi48.
See Richard H. Sander, A Reply to Critics, 57 STAN L. REV. 1963, 1972-73 (2005). The
data reported in Tables 2 and 3 show that the GPA improvement for black "second-choice" students
closely mirrors the reduction in the credential gap between those students and others in the same tier.
49.
Lawrence D. Bobo & Ryan A. Smith, From Jim Crow Racism to Laissez-Faire Racism:
The TransformationofRacial Attitudes, in BEYOND PLURALISM: THE CONCEPTION OF GROUPS AND

GROUP IDENTITIES INAMERICA 199 (Katkin, Landsman & Tyree eds., 1995). This article presents
1990 survey evidence showing that 56% of whites rated blacks as less intelligent than whites, and
over 60% rated blacks as lazier than whites. The survey method had respondents rate various racial
groups on a series of scales, and then compared the average scalar ratings, rather than asking respondents to make direct comparisons. Bobo and Smith also note that whites have moved sharply away
from "biological" explanations for racial differences and towards "cultural" explanations.
50. See, e.g., Richard 0. Lempert, David L. Chambers & Terry K. Adams, "From the
Trenches and Towers": Michigan's Minority Graduates in Practice: The River Runs Through Law
School, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 395 (2000). In their in-depth analysis of affirmative action at the
University of Michigan Law School (UMLS), the authors nowhere mention the abysmal academic
performance of UMLS blacks, 60% of whom had GPAs in the bottom tenth of their class during the
period they studied. In The Shape of the River, Bowen and Bok to their credit do discuss the problem
of poor academic performance of minorities in college. But they misleadingly imply that low grades
are mostly connected to some sort of racial underperformance, rather than the use of preferences by
colleges. Even more misleadingly, when they talk about minority performance they only give "average" class rank (the 23" percentile for elite college blacks, according to them). Given the highly
skewed distribution of minority GPAs towards the bottom of the distribution, an average is very
misleading-an "average" 2 3 rd percentile probably translates to a 10th percentile median. See
wILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF
CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 72 (1998).
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nority performance in test settings.51 If one believes stereotype threat is a
serious issue, isn't it obvious that large-scale preferences are likely to
exacerbate the threat?52 Apparently not to affirmative action partisans,
who have long shown a capacity to simultaneously advocate logically
inconsistent positions.
Instead, partisans have put forward research attempting to show a
variety of educational and attitudinal benefits of affirmative action programs. Much of this research is contradictory on its face. Consider, for
example, the only study of which I am aware that attempts to show educational benefits from diversity in law schools. 53 In the study, Orfield and
Whitla surveyed students at Harvard Law School and the University of
Michigan; a key question asked respondents how many close friends they
had of another racial or ethnic background. A vast majority (over 90%)
of the white respondents responded that they had "three or more" close
friends of another racial/ethnic background, which the authors noted with
satisfaction and took to be evidence of the positive effect of affirmative
action programs. But nearly two-thirds of the black respondents and
nearly three-quarters of the Latino respondents reported two or fewer
close friends of another racial/ethnic background. These varying statistics are logically irreconcilable. The two schools both had enrollments, at
the time the surveys were conducted, that were about 77% white. If we
conservatively assume that the mean student who said she had "three or
more" close friends of another race had four such friends, and estimate
the total number of interracial friendships per one hundred law students,
we find that the white students claimed a total of 293 close interracial
friendships, while blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and American Indians
claimed a total of 50 such friendships. Even if we implausibly assume
that none of the interracial friendships of blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and
American Indians were with members of other minority groups, the
51. Claude Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance
ofAfrican Americans, 69 J. OF PERSONALITY AND Soc. PSYCH. 797 (1995). 1 am a stereotype-threat
skeptic, for three reasons. First, most of research showing stereotype-threat research has been done
in laboratories; tests in real-world settings have not produced comparable results. See Michael J.
Cullen, Chaitra M. Hardison & Paul R. Sackett, Using SAT-Grade and Ability-Job Performance
Relationships to Test Predictions Derivedfrom Sterotype Threat Theory, 89 J. OF APPLIED PSYCH.
220 (2004). Second, in law school at least, entering credentials accurately predict first-year GPA
performance for minorities. See Sander, supra note 48, at 1968. (Research I have completed since
Reply to Critics is even more compelling, demonstrating that blacks and whites have indistinguishable first-semester grades when we control for entering credentials and undergraduate college.)
Third, again in law school, the black-white performance gap is the same or larger in legal writing
classes as in timed exam classes, even though the former should not evoke the stereotype threat
effect. See Sander, Systemic Analysis, supra note 40, at 424.
52. Some research has at least examined how self-perceptions about affirmative action affect
stereotype threat, finding that students who believe they have received large preferences are more
vulnerable to the threat effect. See Colette van Laar, Shana Levin & Stacey Sinclair, Social Identity
and Personal Identity Stereotype Threat: The Case ofAffirmative Action, 30 BASIC AND APPLIED
SOC. PSYCH. 295 (2008).

53.

Gary Orfield & Dean Whitla, Diversity and Legal Education: Student Experiences in

Leading Law Schools, in GARY ORFIELD & MICHAL KURLAENDER, DIVERSITY CHALLENGED:
EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 143 (2001).
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white respondents would still appear to be exaggerating their "close interracial friends" by a factor of six!5 4
All that the extant pro-diversity literature has demonstrated to date
is that college students (and especially those oh-so-bright law students)
manage to pick up quickly on the diversity ideology that pours forth from
deans whenever students are assembled; the students readily infer the
danger of not enthusiastically echoing this ideology whenever the opportunity arises.
An example of the type of research that could help us better understand the actual racial dynamics fostered by affirmative action is a study
of law school study groups. A good deal of anecdotal evidence suggests
that these groups tend to be segregated along racial lines." It is possible
that this simply reflects discrimination or racial preferences, but it is also
possible that this reflects the desire of law students to join study groups
with academically strong members. Individuals who give signals in or
out of class that they are struggling with the material are likely to be
shunned in the competition for good study groups. Worse, if students
decide that academic strength is correlated with race, then black and Hispanic students may be shunned based on their race-an example of how
large preferences could lead directly to invidious discrimination. By examining not only the extent of segregation in study groups, but also how
the level of segregation varies across schools using different levels of
racial preferences, one could gain genuine insight into how preferences
affect racial attitudes and behavior. There is already some significant
circumstantial evidence that a real problem exists. Cross-sectional research shows that participation in a study group tends to raise a student's
first-year law school performance; this makes sense, since talking in
some depth about classes with a cross-section of peers can help an individual "get" the subtle nuances of how law school pedagogy works. But
Hispanic and especially black students do not share these benefits; when
they participate in study groups, their grades are unaffected and sometimes even hurt.' 6 This is consistent with minority students ending up in

54. Further evidence that the Orfield/Whitla survey was merely summoning up PC responses
comes from an analysis done by the eminent sociologist Thomas Espenshade, who asked college
students (in a survey that bad no visible "diversity" agenda) to list their five closest friends; the
survey administrators than coded the race of each identified friend. These results showed (a) no
logical inconsistency in the number of interracial friendships and (b) far lower levels of interracial
friendship than those produced by the Orfield-Whitla survey. Personal communication from Dr.
Espenshade (March 2007).
See generally Kevin Deasy, Enabling Black Students to Realize Their Potential in Law
55.
School: A Psycho-SocialAssessment of an Academic Support Program, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REV.
547 (1991); Cathaleen A. Roach, A River Runs Through It: Tapping into the InformationalStream to
Move Students FromIsolation to Autonomy, 26 ARIZ. L. REv. 667 (1994).
56. Matt Moore, Ailing Method, Essential Motive: An Examination of Two Strategies to
Improve Core Legal Learning Among Underrepresented Minority Law Students (2005) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
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largely segregated study groups comprised of students who tend to be
academically weak.
The idea of doing research on what causes law school study groups
to have differential benefits across racial lines, like the idea of studying
whether large racial preferences foster racial stereotyping, are not particularly original suggestions. Indeed, they are obvious questions if one
gives a little thought to racial dynamics at a contemporary law school.
They have not been studied because they imply an ability to look at diversity issues honestly that does not exist in legal academia (or graduate
schools of education), and perhaps exists nowhere in contemporary
higher education. Until such obvious inquiries are undertaken, it is folly
to believe claims that preference programs effectively combat discrimination, or to defer to the judgment of school administrators in assessing
the benefits of large-scale preferences.
C. Viewpoint diversity
The preeminent justification for race-based affirmative action in
higher education, as articulated in Supreme Court decisions, is the rationale of providing viewpoint diversity on college campuses." An important question, but one rarely asked in anything other than a rhetorical
manner, is how much current preference programs contribute to viewpoint diversity, particularly if the diversity is being provided by uppermiddle-class students from various racial groups. How much do uppermiddle-class minorities add to the viewpoint diversity in the classroom?
Would low-SES students of various races add more?
To investigate how attitudes vary across race and class, I consulted
data from the General Social Survey (GSS). 58 The GSS is a biennial,
national survey of about two thousand adults; through ninety-minute,
face-to-face interviews, the survey seeks to gather core demographic data
from respondents (race, occupation, education, etc.) as well as attitudes
and opinions on a wide variety of political and social issues. The GSS
has a unique status among opinion surveys because of the care with
which it is conducted and the ability to trace the evolution of attitudes on
important issues as far back as 1972. Based on the demographic information collected on respondents, the GSS assigns each respondent a socioeconomic score, using a process similar to the method I used in CALE to
measure SES. With this variable, I assigned each respondent to one of
five roughly equal SES quintiles; I could then divide respondents by both
race and class, and examine variations in attitudes across these cells. I

57. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327-33 (2003).
58. The General Social Survey website, found at http://www.norc.org/GSS+Website/, has a
wealth of information about the survey and its methodology.

LISTENING TO THE DEBATE

2011]

907

emphasize that the analysis presented here is intended to be suggestive
rather than conclusive.59
Table 3
How social perspectives vary across lines of race and
class General Social Survey, 2008 [?]
Percent ofeach group agreeing with position:
Issue positions

Blacks,

bottom two
SES gaintiles

Blacks, top
two SES
quintiles

Whites,

Whites, top

bottom two
SES quintiles

two SES

quintiles

Immigration to

the U.S. should
be reduced ("a

41%

34%

59%

49%

70%

47%

62%

37%

59%

47%

60%

51%

48%

55%

41%

36%

53%

45%

75%

68%

little" or "a lot")

Books by antiAmerican Muslim clerics
should be removed from
public libraries
Women should
not be allowed
to have abortions for any
reason
Homosexuals
should have the
right to marry
("disagree" or
"strongly disagree")
Favor the death
penalty for murder

Source: 2008 GSS, analyses by Yana Kucheva and the author
Table 3 draws on the GSS to tabulate views across class and racial
lines on several controversial social issues. To achieve a reasonable
sample size for blacks, I combine the bottom two and top two SES quintiles. The cleavages along race and class lines are not deep on many issues, suggesting that factors other than SES and race explain much individual variation in attitudes (for example, religion and region are probably as probative or more probative on many social issues than race and
class). Still, this rather simple analysis suggests that both race and class
matter, and interestingly, they seem to matter to differing degrees on
different issues. For example, class divisions are larger than race divisions on questions concerning abortion and free speech. But on other
59. Note, for example, that since I use only a single year of GSS data, the sample sizes for the
black cells are measured only in the dozens. Some of the literature cited in this section provides
examples of more sophisticated methods that sociologists routinely use to reach more definitive
conclusions about attitudinal pattems.
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issues, such as gay marriage, race divisions are more significant than
class divisions, while on still others, such as immigration, both class and
race have significant effects on outlook.
If we put race, class, and other individual characteristics into a regression analysis, social and educational factors often dominate race. For
example, an analysis of GSS data from the 1990s found that educational
level-in particular, college education-was the dominant factor explaining variation in attitudes towards immigration policy; "effects of
race, income, and fear of crime appear to be negligible." 6 0 Larry Bobo
and Frederick Lacari similarly found education quite important, and race
non-significant, in explaining patterns of political tolerance for outlier
groups. 6 1 Law students with low SES will themselves have college degrees by the time they reach graduate school, but they are far more likely
to have family members and friends without college educations than are
students from high-SES backgrounds. Moreover, even when the type of
viewpoints expressed in surveys differ by only ten percentage points
across different classes, this can easily belie a much deeper difference in
assumptions and modes of argument. It makes sense that a wide range of
experiences and attitudes will be missed in law school discussions if only
a negligible proportion of students come from the bottom half of the
class distribution.62
Sociologists who have examined attitudinal differences within the
black population have found conflicting evidence about the depth of a
"class" divide within the black community on major social and racial
issues.6 3 But they do consistently report a greater tendency among uppermiddle-class blacks to favor race-conscious policies and to see racial
64
inequality as a structural characteristic of American society. Poor and
working-class blacks are more likely to favor race-neutral policies that
broadly increase opportunity and social mobility. Some observers have
been puzzled by these patterns, but they fit well with much of the research discussed here and in CALE. After all, if racial preferences in
higher education are the single most salient "race-conscious" policy, this
is certainly one that primarily benefits affluent blacks, and it is not surprising that working-class blacks would have no great passion for the
60. Charles R. Chandler & Yung-mei Tsai, Social FactorsInfluencing Immigration Attitudes:
An Analysis ofDatafrom the General Social Survey, 38 Soc. SCI. J. 177 (2001).
61.
Lawrence Bobo & Frederick C. Licari, Education and Political Tolerance: Testing the
Effects ofcognitive Sophisticationand Target GroupAffect, 53 PUB OPINION Q. 285 (1989).
62. Even recreational activities vary more across working-class groups of different races than
among middle-class groups of different races. Floyd et al., Race, Class, and Leisure Activity
Preferences:Marginality and Ethnicity Rrevisited, 26 J. LEISURE RES.158 (1994).
63. Sean-Shong Hwang, Kevin M. Fitzpatrick & David Helms, Class Differences in Racial
Attitudes: A Divided Black America?, 41 Soc. PERSP. 367 (1998).
64. Jason E. Shelton & George Wilson, Race, Class, and the Basis of Group Alignment: An
Analysis OfSupportfor Redistributive PolicyAmong PrivilegedBlacks, 52 SOC. PERSP. 385 (2009);
Zoltan Hajnal, Black Class Exceptionalism: Insights from Direct Democracy on the Race Versus
Class Debate, 71 PUB OPINION Q. 560 (2007).
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policy. And as Eugene Robinson points out, broad initiatives aimed at
poverty or poor schools, without regard to race, are likely to have more
impact upon the lives of the "Abandoned" than limited race-conscious
policies.
The attitudinal data also suggests that the attitudes of upper-middleclass blacks, to the extent they diverge from those of affluent whites,
match closely the world-views of the typical law professor: very liberal
on issues of individual rights and immigration, progressive but not very
specific on economic justice issues, somewhat hostile to law enforcement, supportive of race-conscious affirmative action. More generally, in
my observation of the environment of a fairly elite law school (UCLA), I
am struck by how little viewpoint diversity actually finds its way into
class discussion. Students seem to sense the prevailing world-view, and
they are reluctant to challenge it on matters touching fundamental values
that spark emotional chords. On issues such as gay marriage and abortion, invitations to discuss the topic often produce no dissent to the prevailing law school worldview (favoring both).
A long-standing critique of law school from the left is that American professions excel at reproducing themselves, and more specifically
legal education elites reproduce themselves in the student bodies they
create. 65 To the extent this is true, it does not seem that contemporary
affirmative action policies create much of an exception. We like to talk
about viewpoint diversity, but there is little critical assessment of how
much such diversity actually exists. Expanding SES diversity would
probably help to introduce some less conventional viewpoints into law
school classrooms, and this would be a good thing.
PART II. STEPS TOWARD REFORM IN LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS
If in Part I I have tried to set the race vs. class debate in a broader
perspective, Part II is about concrete specifics. Section A details a roadmap for the reform of law school preferences. Section B compares this
roadmap with the values articulated by the symposium contributors, and
suggests that there is a good deal of common ground in this debate. Section C works through the question of whether there really are as many
potential low-and-moderate SES law students as I have supposed.
A. A Tentative Proposal
When I published my initial analysis of the "mismatch" effect in
2005,66 many of those in the then-highly-polarized debate assumed that if
I was finding some serious, counterproductive consequences of law
65.
See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF
HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM (2004); see also RICHARD ABEL, AMERICAN

LAWYERS 48-73 (1989).
66.
Sander, Systemic Analysis, supranote 40.
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school racial preferences, I must therefore be on the abolitionist side of
the preferences debate. This assumption was often made, to my initial
surprise, by both supporters and opponents of racial preferences, even
though the piece took no explicit policy position and suggested that a
very promising solution to the mismatch problem was to reduce, rather
than eliminate, the size of existing preferences.
That same pattern shows up, even more strikingly, in this symposium. A sizeable number of the commentaries on my main piece assume-and often build extensive discussions upon the belief that-I see
socioeconomic and racial preferences as an "either/or" proposition, or
even that my "true" agenda is the abolition of racial preferences. This is
simply not the case. I have been asked about my policy views on affirmative action dozens of times-at legislative hearings, in radio interviews,
before national commissions-and I have consistently eschewed abolitionist positions. In other contexts, I've strongly advocated for raceconscious strategies when they are well-justified by empirical findings.
But as my principal essay makes clear, I also do not believe that
"class" and "race" preferences should be considered in isolation. First, I
think it is self-evident that racial preferences, as currently pursued by
American law schools, have some very serious problems; it would be
foolish to construct new preference programs that were not mindful of
the need to avoid similar problems. Second, it is important to understand
how and why racial preferences are no substitute for "class" preferences,
and to realize how thoroughly and hypocritically the legal education establishment ignores class-based issues while claiming to pursue genuine
diversity. Third, as I shall explain in this section, I think it is quite constructive to link the two types of preferences as a matter of policy.
For purposes of making discussion concrete, it is valuable to think
about specific policy formulations. I do not believe we yet know enough
to determine what exact policies would best achieve any particular set of
goals one might articulate, so I would like to consider this section as
something of a thought experiment. Suppose some significant number of
schools endorsed, or were constrained to adopt (by law or by accreditation bodies) the following requirements in awarding admissions preferences:
1) Racial preferences are not limited in size, so long as the average
size of a racial preference given by a law school does not exceed the av67. Id. at 482-83.
68. On eschewing abolitionist positions, see, e.g., my comments in a January 2005 debate: "I
want to keep reminding participants [in the mismatch debate] that one can make enormous progress
in addressing this problem short of abolishing preferences." Legal Affairs Debate Club, January 14,
On my
2005, available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debateclubsander0105.msp.
advocacy of race-conscious strategies in addressing housing segregation, see generally Richard H.
Sander, Individual Rights and Demographic Realities: The Problem of Fair Housing, 82 Nw. U. L.
REv. 874 (1988).
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erage size of its socioeconomic preferences. In determining socioeconomic preferences, schools should not only be permitted, but encouraged, to use factors which recognize the intersections of class and race,
such as the level of poverty in the neighborhood one lived in during high
school, whether one is raised in a single-parent family, and the academic
strength of one's high school.
2) Any student admitted to a law school with credentials below the
average of the law school's matriculants must be given a disclosure report with the school's admissions letter. The disclosure report provides
objective information on the following: (a) the average law school GPA
earned by matriculants at that school with the applicant's credentials; (b)
the graduation rate of matriculants at that school with the applicant's
credentials; (c) the bar passage rate of graduates of that school with the
applicant's credentials; and (d) the median and mean earnings, and rate
of occupation as a lawyer, for graduates of that school with the applicant's credentials.
3) At least half of the financial aid given by any law school must be
need-based, unless the school can demonstrate that dependent students
from families with incomes below the national median are able to complete their law degree at the school without, on average, adding more
educational debt than those students assumed during their undergraduate
college careers.
4) Law schools should offer courses and research fellowships explicitly aimed at "pipeline" problems-that is, how academic preparation
gaps can be reduced across racial and socioeconomic lines, and how mobility and representation can be fostered in the absence of admissions
preferences. Graduates working on these problems should be given especially generous loan forgiveness terms.
These four practices directly address many of the most serious
weaknesses in current law school preference systems, and they also create incentives with further beneficial effects. Consider some of the properties of this system:
* Flexibility. Practice I gives schools great discretion and flexibility in the design of preference systems. The school can choose the size
and focus of their racial and class preferences, so long as the size of the
preferences are measured, and so long as the average size of race preferences does not exceed those used for class.
* Measurement. Practice 1 also pushes schools to develop some
system of defining the size of preferences they use. This addresses a basic defect in the law governing preferences. Both Justice Powell in Bakke
v. University of California,and Justice O'Connor in Grutter v. Bollinger,
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evaded the hard choices implicit in their decisions by phrasing preference
doctrine in very vague terms.6 9 As I suggested in Systemic Analysis, and
as Ian Ayres and Sydney Foster forcefully elaborated two years later, the
governance of racial preferences is not viable-and strict scrutiny is not
meaningful-in the absence of concrete methods of measuring preferences and evaluating their costs relative to their benefits. 7 0 A number of
viable methods of measuring and comparing preferences have been advanced.
* Narrow tailoring.Practice 1 gives substance to the general constitutional understanding that the use of race should be narrowly tailored to
the ends sought-in other words, that race should only be used as much
as is vital to achieve its compelling justification.72 Consider: both race
and class help diversify the classroom; class diversity is currently more
lacking than race diversity; viewpoint diversity is, plausibly, at least as
enhanced by greater class diversity as by race diversity; class diversity
addresses more salient, and more neglected, mobility and opportunity
problems in our society. And class-based preferences are not suspectfor good reason-in the way that racial preferences are.73 Practice (1) is
thus a logical way for a school to achieve narrow tailoring in a meaningful way.
* Transparency. Practice 2 is an enormous step towards giving applicants the facts they need to make rational choices about (and between)
law schools-an issue that has received great attention this year in the
related context of law school data on employment prospects.7 4 Students
should not only have accurate employment data for the school as a
whole; they should have good information on their individual prospects
for graduating, passing the bar, and getting a good job. The sort of
school-wide data available today is sufficient for students with credentials at or above the school median, but it is misleading and deceptive for
students admitted with preferences. Especially in an era of rising law
school costs and a weak market for law graduates, elemental fairness
requires that students have good information.
69. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306 (2003). Richard Sander, Why Strict Scrutiny Requires Transparency: The PracticalEffects of
Bakke, Gratz, and Grutter, in NEW DIRECTIONS INJUDICIAL POLITICS (Kevin McGuire, ed., forthcoming 2012).
70. Sander, Systemic Analysis, supra note 40, at 390-410; Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don't
Tell, Don't Ask: Narrow TailoringAfter Grutter and Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517 (2007); see also
Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 631 F.3d 213, 249-51 (5th Cir. 2011) (Garza, J., concurring).
71. A discussion of these methods, and the logical necessity of such criteria to implement
strict scrutiny, is in Ayres & Foster, supra note 70; Sander, supra note 4.
72. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326-28.
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
73.
74. David Segal, Law School Economics: Ka-Ching!, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2011, available at
www.nytimes.com/2011/07/17/business/law-school-economics-job-market-weakens-tuitionrises.html; Elie Mystal, A Resigning Law Dean Spills the Beans on the Fleecing of Law Students,
ABOVE THE LAW, July 29, 2011, available at http://abovethelaw.com/2011/07/a-law-dean-resignsand-spills-the-beans-on-how-his-university-has-been-taking-advantage-of-law-students/.
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* Transparency also addresses-and resolves-the mismatch question, by transforming it from an academic debate into a simple matter of
choice. If students admitted with very large preferences to a higherranked school learn, through disclosure, that their prospects at that school
seem worse (at least in some respects) than their prospects at a lowerranked school, they can evaluate the tradeoff for themselves. If a significant number of students begin to reject more elite schools for less-elite
ones, this will cause the more elite schools to re-evaluate their practices.
Moreover, simply disclosing the often-dismal facts about outcomes for
students receiving large preferences will push schools to make useful
reforms to their own curricula, such as improved academic support or the
development of better predictors of long-term success. Better data also
helps schools properly calibrate preferences, by focusing their attention
on the tradeoff between preference size and student outcomes.
* 'Need' over zero-sum competition. Most law school financial aid
is spent to recruit very high-credential students, or to compete for minority (but affluent) applicants. Both efforts are essentially zero-sum enterprises; one school's loss is another's gain. Practice 3 pushes schools to
devote a significant part of their financial aid towards a positive-sum
effort: improving access for applicants of limited means. This helps to
put financial aid in legal education on a more principled basis; as nearly
all the commentators agree, it is better on moral grounds for schools to
use financial aid to help those in need and increase opportunity, rather
than (through merit-based aid) using aid as merely another strategy for
inching up the US News rankings. Practice 3 also helps to guard against
the possibility that law schools will cynically comply with Practice I by
making offers of admission to students who have little chance of being
able to afford to accept, in the absence of any aid. In other words, it helps
to insure that schools actually devote some portion of their growing resources to foster genuine diversity.
* Focusing on the pipeline. Practice 4 follows Professor Kiel's suggestion that law schools direct genuine effort toward the underlying
problems that cause racial and class enrollment disparities-generally
known as the "pipeline" problem. This resonates with Justice
O'Connor's holding in Grutter that law schools should have strategies
for reducing their dependence over time on racial preferences. Practices
(1) and (3) reinforce this focus on expanding the pipeline, by making it
more difficult and costly for law schools to solve their "diversity" problem by the simple expedient of racial preferences. (Practice 2 also makes
it harder for schools to shift the costs of preferences onto unwitting students.) Of course, these efforts may have a very small impact relative to
the size of the problem. But the effort is important in itself, and the expe-
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rience of schools such as the University of California suggest that pipeline initiatives can make a large difference.
Moderatingpreferences. Though none of the four practices mandate that schools curtail racial preferences, each of them is likely to have
that effect over time. This should warm the hearts of those who are skeptical of racial preferences on a variety of moral and legal grounds, including, of course, an apparent majority of American voters and a majority of Supreme Court Justices. But that should not be in itself a reason for
those who support preferences to reject this approach. These practices all
go to the heart of the best motivations behind preferences-to foster mobility, inclusion, and genuine diversity-while recognizing that racial
preferences must have some logical end point. The practices each push
schools to be more thoughtful about their preference policies, a sort of
introspection that in recent years has been sadly lacking.
B. Consensus Approach: The Contributorsand the Proposal
The reform strategy I have outlined is intended not only to build on
the general problems identified in CALE, but also to respond creatively
to the widely varying perspectives of the symposium contributors. Is it
possible to find reasonable areas of consensus that connect the values of
thoughtful observers, even if they require some compromise on favored
policies? That is my inquiry in this section.
Table 4 summarizes my interpretation of three key aspects in each
of the ten commentaries in this issue. For the sake of brevity I have, of
course, oversimplified the work, and I apologize for that. But there are
some genuine benefits to a direct side-by-side comparison of the authors.

In the wake of Proposition 209, the University of California adopted innovative, large75.
scale outreach efforts to improve the rate at which disadvantaged students could qualify for university admission. See, e.g., KARL S. PISTER, UC OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, UC OUTREACH:
at
available
(1998),
Plan
STRATEGIC
AND
PERSPECTIVE
SYSTEMWIDE

http://www.ucop.edulucophome/commserv/outreach/outpdfloutreach.pdf . Within a few years of
implementation, the number of blacks and Hispanics admitted to the UC undergraduate system
exceeded the numbers achieved under the old, racial preference system. It is plausible that improved
outreach played a significant role.
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Table 4
A Summary of the Commentators and Their Goals
Author

Central message

Reforms endorsed

Consonant elements of
my proposal

(1) Taking account of
both class and race in
admissions;
It is a mistake to
supplant a
entirely
o n
"race"
o n discourse with
a "class" discourse.

(2) Expanding needbased scholarships;
(3) Better data on demography of law school

Substantive features are
quite similar; like
Bowen, I favor taking
wealth into account in
assessing SES; not clear
how "large" a preference
Bowen favors for particular groups.
qitsmiarlkadmissions

HolleyWalker

Kahlenberg

Law schools should
foster SES diversity,
but not at the expense
of racial diversity.

(1) Taking account of
both class and race in
admissionsmodification

H-W might well have
concerns about any
of racial
preferences, but the spirit

(2) Better data and
research on what policies
have biggest effect on
both the class diversity
of entering classes, and
on retention,.ugstos

s
r
ogmy
ing SES and racial pref
erences, and increasing
transparency and evaluation) harmonize well
with her normative
suggestions.

We should remedy
the neglect of "class"
in admissions poli-

(1) Moving towards
rather than
"a

cies; a good deal of
other research is
consonant with
Sander's basic findings.

race" preferences;
(2) Greatly improving
fin
fancial supportfo

my proposal as not going
far enough, but he is very
component as a step in
the right direction.
pro-sal studentin

Law schools should
Debates about law
school admissions
policies overlook the
the
fundamental
imporof the pipeline;
we must seek longKel
term improvement in
tequantity and
quality of both lowSES and URM
applicants.

Lmet

Sander interestingly
highlights the lack of
SES diversity in law
schools, but there are
many underlying
challenges in properly understanding
tclass" that make
facile reforms unwise.

(f) include themes of
fixing the pipeline in
institutional thinking and
rhetoric;
(2) foster research and
focused interventions
related to the pipeline
problem;
(3) modify admissions
systems to foster SES
diversity.

Further research is
desirable, but for now
we know too little to
intelligently improve
upon our current practices.

Very close consonance
between Kiel's values
and those animating my
seouou
towardshmore
reform proposal;
as
ttance
discussed in accompanywogltext, mys
ref ors
twuldsalorpshescols
investment in the pipeline issue.

Lempert is perhaps,
among all the commentatori, most comfortable
with the status quo.
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Consonant elements of
my proposal

Elite law schools should
Sander helpfully
nudges scholarship
and policy towards
greater awareness of
Malamud
SES issues, but hismore
critiques of racial
preferences are
counterproductive,
On-(2
While "class" diversiyin law school is
desirable, it is not so
Willig &
easily achieved as
ip
Sander suggests and
not a substitute for
rfis

Reeves
________sically

Wald

(1) increase at the margin low-SES recruitment
and admissions;
(2) reform financial aid
policies to improve focus
on "need" and low-toapplicants.
SESfiania
middle
aid
reforma
Law school admissions
should take greater
account of SES diver-ale
sity, and strive to eliminate subtle sources ofbuts
bias against low-SES
middeiSESiypplic
.

I tinkmy ropsa
ih h
The type of SES preferences suggested in my
naottouets

doubt-car

arthey'd support any
change
ences. in racial prefer-

Comparisons of SES

Greater SES diversity is

The use of "intersection-

and racial preferences
or policies are intrinincoherent.

andit srivelt
disity,
should
good, but
emphasize the intersections race and class,
Law schools should
modify admissions

ow.limi-iulrw
ality" in my construction
of SES preferences
should appeal to Reeves.
Wald's proposals mesh

Low-SES students
are as vulnerable to
stigma and mismatch
as are URM students,
y

policies to increase
doiv SES
dvriyanshud
ngorously evaluate
o
s
and implement more
ve an
tgsive and
iuagmrlivegaadmic
toesuprht

closlytierh m
both emphasize the
responsibility of law
schools for student
success (which in my
view also requires
schools to be honest
about the risks entailed
with preferences).

should be undertaken
with eyes wide open.

both low-SES and URM
admits succeed,

Weeden

rlts
valuesal
suppots buts clarly

Race-related disadvantage has an increasingly economic
cast; shifting admissions policies towards an SES focus
thus has much to
tgcommend

it.

Implicitly, Weedon
favors at least a partial
shift from race-based
admissions preferences
to SES-based preferences.

Weedon's normative
prescription seems to fit
vey well with my recommendations.

s mat

I don't know how many of the commentators would endorse the
proposals I've advanced, but I do know that the four practices I've outlined reflect a genuine effort to grapple with the problems in our current
preference system while listening to the values expressed by the contributing authors. Professors Weedeon, Wald, Kiel, and Mr. Kahlenberg are
probably those most dissatisfied with the current system; they share my
basic assumption that current practices are fundamentally flawed, and
most of the reforms I suggest are more or less akin to the types of reforms they advance, too. Professors Bowen, Holley-Walker, and Onwauachi-Willig, and Ms. Reeves and Ms. Fricke, all acknowledge that
the lack of socioeconomic diversity is a problem, and they support a variety of strategies to try and increase it. For them, a common concern is
that "class" preferences supplant racial ones; each of them emphasizes,
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in one way or another, that race creates special barriers in society, and
that racial diversity has a uniquely important role in legal education. I
think they tend to overestimate this point (as I have elaborated in Part I)
and underestimate the costs of racial preferences (as I will discuss in Part
IV), but I nonetheless have some sympathy for their argument. Moreover, I think the values they emphasize can be reflected in reform proposals that give schools considerable leeway in using racial preferences,
while structuring the implementation in a way that erodes the most damaging practices. I also believe that I recognize the intersections of class
and race, and, as Practice 1 emphasizes, it is important to design socioeconomic preferences in ways that capture the special SES disadvantages
experienced by many nonwhites (particularly blacks).
Many of the symposium contributors believe that better information
and thoughtful research are necessary and important; both my transparency proposal (Practice 2) and the "pipeline" initiative (Practice 4, borrowed directly from Professor Kiel) foster just this sort of information
and purposeful investigation. Section C of this Part, infra, discusses
what we know about the pipeline in more detail.
For many of the symposium contributors, and no doubt for many
readers, any disquiet about the lack of SES diversity (or the other problems I've suggested exist in the current system) is overshadowed by a
general contentment with things as they are, and a belief that outside
forces are unlikely to preempt the discretion of law schools to make reforms when and if they choose. How one feels about my proposal, in
other words, may depend significantly on how much outside pressure
there is to change. Faced with a Prop 209-like ballot initiative that seeks
to ban racial preferences altogether, or with a Supreme Court poised to
apply the philosophy of Seattle School District or Adarand to higher
education preferences, my proposal would probably be appealing to
many who otherwise would prefer the status quo.
I don't think law schools can afford to be complacent. The rising
cost of law school and the weakness of the legal market create pressure
for reform. Evidence of the mismatch effect continues to mount (see Part
IV). Because of this, the legitimacy of a preference system that is entirely
focused on race, and creates barriers to low-SES students, will continue
to erode. A broader conversation about reform is not only the right thing
to do; it is the smart thing to do.
C. Is Class Diversity Feasible?
Some of the commentators suggest that class-based preferences are
impractical because there are too few low-SES students available for law
schools to admit. As I noted in CALE, it is certainly true that pipeline
issues play a large role in the dearth of socioeconomic diversity in legal
education. But if law schools shift from being part of the problem to being part of the solution, there is little danger of shortages, even if class-
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based preferences are far smaller (as they should be) than those currently
used in race-based affirmative action.
It is helpful to think of the "pipeline" problem as having five distinct aspects:
a) The narrowing effect of social inequality in the formative yearsthat is, the ways that poor primary schooling, parenting practices, and a
myriad of other social factors shrink the number of high school students
with the academic preparation necessary to succeed at challenging colleges and graduate schools.
b)The effect of aspirations-the degree to which social conditions
cause more privileged students to want, and therefore to pursue, more
privileged occupations, while less privileged students settle for jobs that
seem more "realistic" and attainable, given the hurdles in their path.
c) The effect of colleges-the degree to which undergraduate institutions effectively recruit the available talent and insure that baccalaureate programs at least do not have the effect of further narrowing the pipeline;
d)The effect of law school policy-the degree to which law school
admissions and outreach practices further narrow or expand the pipeline.
e) The effect of financial assistance-in economic terms, how "elastic" is the supply of low-SES students of high promise, given greater or
lesser degrees of financial assistance?
In CALE, I provided some evidence on points (d) and (e). Law
school admission practices tend to undercut rather than promote SES
diversity, and current law school financial aid policies largely ignore
economic need. In this section, I will provide some evidence on (a), (b)
and (c).
a) Academic preparation across class lines.
Academic preparation among high school students, as measured by
various types of test scores, is strongly correlated with SES. Does the
underrepresentation of low-SES students in law school simply reflect the
scarcity of academically strong candidates in their ranks?
The National Educational Longitudinal Study (NELS), which I have
drawn upon for data earlier in this paper and in CALE, is a good source
for considering this question. It started in 1988 with a large national
sample of eighth-graders and tracked them over the next twelve years.
Participants took a battery of tests in their high school years. Table 5
summarizes the relevant findings:
76. NELS is discussed in CALE's Appendix 2; additional documentation is available here:
http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/nels88/.
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Table 5
High-Performing Students in Two Socioeconomic Groups
Testing threshold:
Proportion of students scoring at the 94th percentile plus
Number of students scoring at the 94th percentile plus
Proportion of students scoring at the 80th percentile plus
Number of students scoring at the 80th percentile plus

Socioeconomic group
Bottom
Top
tenth
half
1.5%
22%
_30,000

-88,000

8.5%

54%

~170,000

~216,000

Source: Author's calculations from NELS. The "number" estimates
assume an annual cohort of four million students, roughly the recent annual average of 8th graders.
These numbers should be viewed as rough estimates, but they make
the point well enough. Academic preparation certainly does explain part
of the gap in SES representation in law school; low-SES students are far
less likely to have top scores than very high-SES students. But by the
same token, there are numerically a lot of high-performing, low-SES
students.
There is every reason to think that the low-SES students who score
in high school at the 9 4 th percentile nationally, or above, would develop
into college students fully qualified to enter the most elite law schools;
certainly those schools currently admit many students who, even in their
twenties, do not have credentials at the 9 4 th percentile of a national pool.
For every three very-high-SES NELS students at the 94th percentile,
there is one low-SES student with comparable scores. Yet at the elite law
schools, the ratio of very-high-SES students to low-SES students is 11:1.
In other words, even if we assume that attending college would not narrow the academic preparation gap of high- and low-SES students, and
even if we assumed that no preferences were used by law schools to admit low-SES students, the pool of raw talent among low-SES students
still overshadows their presence in elite law schools.
Similarly, it is a conservative estimate to suggest that high school
students who score in the 80th percentile are on the path to being academically competitive for a place in the broader spectrum of law schools.
In relative terms, low-SES students are still underrepresented compared
to those from the SES top tenth; but the relative gap is narrower, and the
absolute gap has almost disappeared (the absolute ratio is about 6:5). Yet
in the actual law school population (see Table 1 in CALE), the ratio of
very-high-SES students to low-SES students is well over 2:1. In other
words, a very conservative approach to controlling for academic prepara-
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tion still suggests dramatic underrepresentation of very able but low-SES
students.
b) Aspirations: Do low-SES students want to go to law school?
Dr. Lempert suggests that the pipeline of low-SES students is quite
slim, in part because low-SES students do not aspire to go to law school
in anything like the same numbers as high-SES students.77 As evidence,
he cites the same data source (the Warkov study) that I used in CALE to
examine law school SES diversity in the 1960s. Warkov's research is
very valuable in studying historical trends (as I use it), but it is hardly a
reliable source for making claims about contemporary conditions.
Moreover, the specific data and tables Lempert relies on are not at all
designed to answer the question of interest. The Warkov data shows that
among freshmen college students in the late 1950s, those who reported
that they intended to pursue a graduate degree in law had more elite
backgrounds than those who expressed no such goal. The data do not tell
us, even for this distant era, answers to more relevant questions: among
the most talented young people, how many would aspire to become lawyers (or other professionals) if they could see a realistic path to the goal?
What might be the pattern of aspirations if we could set aside financial
and admissions barriers, or counsel them on their chances of admission
to law school given their current academic level of achievement?
Lempert suggests that 'alas, better data does not exist,' but in this he
is surely mistaken. An abundance of surveys, such as the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and the National Educational Longitudinal
Survey, ask far more recent cohorts of high school students and college
freshmen about their career aspirations, and have much richer background data on respondents than one can obtain from the Warkov tables.
I consulted one source, a College Board dataset on SAT takers, that I
happen to be using for another project, and summarize the results of my
inquiry here. High school students who take the SAT complete a questionnaire in their initial application which asks them, among many other
things, about their highest degree aspiration. These answers are
anonymized and combined with the results of their SAT I and SAT II
examinations into large databases; researchers can request extracts of
these data. My research team obtained a large extract originally created
for the economists David Card and Alan Krueger, which Professor Card
generously (and with College Board's permission) shared with us. 78

77. Richard Lempert, Reflections on Class in American Legal Education,88 DENv. U.L. REV.
683, 702 (2011).
78. High school students who take the SAT complete a questionnaire in their initial application to the College Board which asks them, among many other things, about their highest degree
aspiration. These answers are anonymized and combined with the results of their SAT I and SAT II
examinations into large databases; researchers can request extracts of these data. My research team
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Table 6 presents data on the degree aspirations of different pools of
high school students taking the SAT. The SES quintiles used here are
constructed by methods similar to those I applied in CALE to the AJD
data, except that in the College Board data, we have information onfamily income rather than parents' occupations (both data sets have information on the highest degree obtained by mother and father).
Table 6
Degree aspirations of low- and high-SES high school students
Degree
Aspiration
Doctoral
Master's

Bottom SES quintile
All SAT- SAT-takers w/
takers
math SAT >650
18%
35%
27%

33%

Top SES quintile
All SAT- SAT-takers w/
takers
math SAT>650
26%
42%
34%

32%

Bachelor's
27%
14%
21%
9%
Lower/other
7%
2%
2%
0%
17%
16%
17%
21%
Undecided
Source: College Board Sample of High School Juniors Taking the SAT,
with Questionnaire and Score Data, 1994-2001.
The data show a remarkable similarity in the aspirations of highand low-SES students, especially among those with high test scoresthat is, those who would meet the "academic preparation" test laid out in
the previous section. Table 6 does not support Lempert's intuition that
low-SES students have dramatically lower aspirations than high-SES
students.
c) The Role of Colleges.
Every scholar who has closely examined the question has concluded
that low-SES students are extremely underrepresented at elite schools,
whether those schools are public or private. Young people growing up in
the top SES quartile are some twenty times as likely to attend such as
school as are their bottom SES quartile counterparts. The proportion of
enrolled students qualifying for Pell Grants hovers around 10-12% at
nearly all the elite undergraduate colleges in the nation.7 9
The notion that this simply reflects an inadequate supply of strong
low-SES students is belied by the record of the University of California,
where (as noted in CALE) the two most elite undergraduate schools have
Pell Grant rates of 32% (at Berkeley) and 33% (at UCLA).so The obstacles to SES diversity at elite colleges are similar to the obstacles at law
obtained a large extract originally created for the economists David Card and Alan Krueger, which
Professor Card generously (and with College Board's permission) shared with us.
79. Pell Grants are federal scholarships available, roughly speaking, to students in the bottom
half of the income distribution. They are discussed in more detail at CALE, supra note 1, at 641
n.29.
80. See CALE, supra note 1, at notes 28 & 30.
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schools: limited outreach, a focus on racial diversity to the neglect of
SES diversity, and inadequate financial aid-though on all three counts I
believe the record at many elite schools is now far better than the record
at nearly all law schools.
One way of getting a sense of college outreach practices is to measure the likelihood that the most able high school students in different
socioeconomic and racial groups will send their SAT scores to elite institutions. The College Board data allows us to do this, and the results of
one analysis are shown in Table 7. Note that this data describes the
score-sending behavior of students with aggregate SAT scores (math and
verbal combined) of 1200 or higher-roughly the top tenth of SAT takers, and a group that is plausibly competitive for even the top schools.
Table 7
Probability of Students Sending SAT Scores to a Very Elite
College Among 1999 SAT-takers Scoring Above 1200
SES quintile
Lowest
2nd
3rd
4th
Highest

Asians

Blacks

Hispanics

Whites

34%
37%
41%
47%
61%

4%
8%
15%
25%
48%

8%
16%
22%
30%
45%

14%
14%
18%
22%
34%

Source: Author's calculations with College Board cross-section database. Colleges include the Ivy League, Duke, and Stanford.
The patterns in Table 7 are telling. Socioeconomic status plays an
enormous role in determining which students apply to elite schools.
Large numbers of very able but low-SES high school students are never
admitted to elite schools because they are never make it into the applicant pool. The class disparities are more intense for Hispanics and most
intense for African-Americans. These numbers, at least, suggest that a
greater focus on SES in outreach and "pipeline" efforts would disproportionately benefit low-income underrepresented minorities. Recall our
earlier finding that, even after controlling for test scores, low-SES high
school graduates are 80% less likely to attend college than high-SES
graduates, while blacks are 30% more likely to attend college than similar whites. Table 7 seems to be telling much the same story, in a slightly
different context: high-SES blacks are more likely to be in the applicant
pool than comparable whites, while low-SES persons of all races are
largely missing.
What does this review tell us about the relative importance of the
five factors (identified at the beginning of this section) in narrowing the
pipeline of opportunity for low-SES youths? There is not much evidence
that low aspirations are the problem. The size of the "strongly academically prepared" pool is obviously a factor, but a huge gap remains after
adjusting for the size of the talent pool. Inadequate outreach by higher
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education appears to be a very large factor, and, as we saw in CALE, law
school admissions and financial aid practices are large factors as well.
Although this paper does not attempt a precise forecast of what would be
necessary to achieve particular low-and-moderate SES enrollment goals,
I think this discussion makes clear that simply overhauling aid and outreach policies to address "class" disparities would, by itself, probably
make a substantial difference. Pipeline initiatives reaching high school
students, and very modest preferences (equivalent to two or three LSAT
points) would make an even larger difference. The bottom line: this is a
problem where college and professional school policies matter, and they
matter a lot.
PART III: RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC CRITIQUES

A. MethodologicalIssues
In general, the commentators in this issue agree that CALE does a
fair job of capturing the SES distribution of law students and young lawyers. In particular, there is a good deal of consensus that the data captures a genuine lack of SES diversity at law schools, which increases
with the eliteness of the law school.
There are some dissonant notes, and in this section I will address
them.
Dr. Lempert points out that my primary data source, After the JD
(AJD), is based on a sample of young lawyers-that is, people who have
actually graduated and passed the bar-rather than law students. 8 ' If lowSES students are more likely to drop out of law school or fail the bar,
then lawyers as a group would be more elite than law students, and my
measures would understate the level of SES diversity within law
schools.82
It is a fair point, but one that's easily addressed. The Bar Passage
Study (BPS) from the 1990s contains an enormous sample of first-year
law students, and thus avoids the weakness Lempert identifies in the
AJD. I did not rely primarily on the BPS in constructing my SES indices
because the BPS is somewhat older data (it tracks a cohort six years
older than the median AJD respondent) and, more importantly, because it
has much less detailed data on parental occupation. But the data on parental education was collected in very similar fashion by the BPS and
81.
Lempert, supranote 77, at 694-95.
82. Id.
83.
The Bar Passage Study ("BPS") was a longitudinal study of law students conducted by the
Law School Admissions Council in the 1990s. It tracked over twenty-seven thousand students from
matriculation to law school in 1991 through their efforts to pass the bar in the mid-1990s. All participants completed a detailed "entering student questionnaire", from which this socioeconomic data
is drawn. The survey covered roughly eighty percent of all law students at roughly ninety percent of
all law schools, providing an excellent sample for the purposes discussed here. It is certainly not
subject to any of the selection bias problems identified by Dr. Lempert.
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AJD, and thus can provide an ideal check on whether the AJD data gives
a misleading picture. Table 8 summarizes the comparison:
Table 8
Distribution of Parental Education AJD
National Sample Compared to BPS Entering Law Students
Top Educational
Level Completed
Grade school
Some high school
High school grad
Trade school
Associate degree
Bachelor's deg
Some grad school
Grad/prof degree

AJD
Mothers
2.5%
3.2%
22.1%
4.7%
16.6%
24.6%
4.3%
22.1%

BPS
Mothers
2.5%
3.3%
22.3%
5.6%
19.7%
21.7%
6.2%
19.4%

AJD
Fathers
3.3%
3.4%
14.9%
3.9%
11.8%
18.8%
4.1%
39.9%

BPS
Fathers
2.9%
3.5%
12.8%
3.7%
10.1%
18.7%
5.6%
40.0%

Source: Author's calculations based on AJD and BPS datasets
While the AJD and BPS distributions are not identical, they are extraordinarily similar. AJD mothers are slightly more likely to have finished college than their BPS counterparts, 4 but AJD fathers are slightly
less likely to have finished college. There is no evidence here that limitations in the AJD are leading us to overstate the SES eliteness of law students.
Dr. Lempert also wonders whether missing observations in the AJD
bias the data: "I am concerned that his SES index is less reliable when it
is based on two measures rather than four."8 5 This too is a reasonable
concern; in particular, one might wonder whether respondents who only
report two measures (and in some cases come from single-parent families) have much lower SES measures than those who report four measures. Table 9 shows the median SES index computed from respondents,
depending on how many of the four SES questions they answered. (Note
that the relatively small number of respondents who provided only one
response were excluded from my analyses in CALE, from the same concern Lempert identifies.) While it is likely true that indices based on
fewer measures are somewhat less reliable, there's no evidence in Table
9 that this defect biases the general SES analysis upwards or downwards.

84.
85.

And the small gap is plausibly due to the slightly older cohort.
Lempert, supra note 77, at 690-91.
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Table 9
Median "SES Index" by Number of SES Questions Answered in AJD
Number ofanswers
(out ofpossible 4)
1
2

3
4

Median SES
Index
83
80

75.7
79.5

Source: Author's calculations from AJD data
Onwachi-Willig and Fricke (O-W&F) are perhaps, among the contributors, most skeptical of my SES analysis. They raise an interesting
point: is it possible to really compare the socioeconomic status of different racial groups, since race is part of one's SES?86 Analytically, the answer is "yes": the whole point of social analysis is to break down social
phenomenon into different components and try to understand how they
interact. (One could similarly argue that "income" and "education" are
inseparable-certainly how one uses one's income depends in part on
one's level and type of education. But that doesn't mean one can't usefully examine each apart from the other, and study how they interact.) In
another sense, O-W&F have a point: as I have discussed a number of
times, the SES measures in CALE tend to overstate black SES, because
blacks at a given education or income level typically have less wealth
and live in poorer neighborhoods than similar whites. (But these limitations can be and are overcome in well-executed class-based admissions
systems.)
The most important flaw in O-W&F's argument, however, is that
the effect of race on one's social condition clearly varies with one's other
socioeconomic characteristics. If one is in the bottom two quintiles of
SES, one's circumstances are generally far less dire if one is white than if
one is black. The interaction of "race" and "low SES" amplifies many
types of problems for blacks-and for Hispanics to a large degree. In
contrast, as I discuss in Part I-C, the effect of race on blacks in the top
quintile of SES is much more ambiguous. High-SES blacks generally
have good access to mainstream opportunities and networks, and have
the added advantage of race-specific networks. They absorb a very disproportionate share of all the race-related preferences extended in education, employment, and other spheres; controlling for human capital characteristics, they tend to out-earn other races, especially early in their careers. This is exactly why it is important to compare "race" and "class"
effects.

86. Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Amber Fricke, Class, Classes, and Classic Race-Baiting:
What's in a Definition?,88 DENV. U. L. REV. 807, 808-09 (2011).
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Onwachi-Willig and Fricke also argue that my SES analysis is
deeply flawed because of improper classifications and analytic choices.
They say:
In deciding where to insert 'meaningful breaks', as Malamud would
describe them, Professor Sander has created a misleadingly heavily
weighted high SES scheme. For example, a female registered nurse is
accorded an occupational score of 75 out of 100, which places her in
the high SES quartile. Such a placement does not seem to accord
with what the average person would consider high SES . . . by creat-

ing such a broad category of high SES persons, Professor Sander
conflates the privilege of high SES persons by race, considering that
Blacks heavily populate the occupations at the bottom end of that
quartile. Indeed, Sander's misleading SES scheme has far-reaching
implications all throughout this analysis because we cannot be certain
if any of his groupings are accurate and meaningful and thus cannot
truly rely on any comparisons that he makes between the various racial and class groups.
There are three claims here. First, is the "75" SES score assigned to
registered nurses too high, and thus a sign that the SES coding scheme is
unreliable? No, it is not. Registered nurses88 complete, on average, several years of college-level training; many consider an "R.N." degree to
be roughly comparable to a bachelor's, and many R.N.s independently
hold bachelor degrees. More concretely, registered nurses have high
earnings: in 2009, the median female registered nurse had earnings of
$60,000, putting her at the 8 0th percentile of all women earners.89 There
is no evidence that the "75" score is inappropriate. Second, are these SES
scores a "Sander scheme"? No, they are not. As I explain in detail in the
CALE appendices, my SES methodologies are based on the most authoritative indices developed by social science scholars-primarily sociologists in England and the United States.90 These indices are basic tools of
the trade for scholars studying social stratification. Third, are the results
in CALE deceptively influenced by a strategic choice of "break points"?
No, they are not. O-W&F's argument implies that, for example, a particularly high number of black law students are swept into the "75 th to
90t percentile" range because they have SES values at the bottom end of
this range. In fact, the median law student in all the cells of Tables 1 and
8 of CALE has an SES score that is higher than the midpoint of the cell.
Consider, for example, the third data cell in the fourth data column of
CALE's Table 8 which reports that among black law students at the top
87. Id. at 812-13.
88.
Note that there are several occupational tiers of nurses; vocational nurses are assigned
lower scores for occupational prestige than registered nurses, while nurse practitioners are assigned
somewhat higher scores.
89. Author's analysis of data contained in: U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, AMERICAN
COMMUNITY SURvEY (2009).

90.

See CALE, supra note 1, at 670 app. 1.
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two tiers of law schools, 23% have SES scores in the 75th to 90th percentile range, and 43% have SES scores in the 9 0 th to 9 9 th range.9 1 The median score of the blacks in the first group is at the 8 4 th percentile, and the
median score of the blacks in the second group is at the 9 6 th percentile. 9 2
In other words, my groupings are understating the "average" actual
eliteness of these students. Indeed, because of the top-skewness of the
law student SES distribution, any broad grouping will understate the
actual eliteness of these students.
B. On the Visibility of Class
In CALE's comparison of race and class preferences, I wrote:
Moreover, [class-based preferences] are "invisible": once students
have matriculated to a law school, no one can readily tell which of
the others have received a preference. Both the small size and the invisibility of these preferences are advantages. Students receiving
such preferences are much less likely to be stigmatized and, indeed,
may not even be aware that they have received a preference. They
are also likely to perform scholastically at levels close to the middle
of the class, a good thing both for them and for the academic atmosphere of the school. There is much less likely to be group selfsegregation or the nourishment of group resentment, which sometimes happens with strictly race-based preferences. 93
Professor Wald builds his comment largely around this passage. He
argues that class identity is not only palpable, but that "socioeconomic
preferences are going to be as visible as race preferences"; that "socioeconomic preferences will impose similar, if not higher costs" on their
recipients; and that the "social and cultural capital" of students (which
Wald thinks are closely associated with their SES) "have a considerable
impact" on the careers of these students.
Some of Wald's language makes me bristle a bit. I thought it was
clear from my essay (see the quoted passage) that I meant "invisibility"
in a relative, not an absolute sense. Certainly, if I thought class was a
completely invisible trait, I should not place so much importance on SES
diversity in the first place. And much of the lessened visibility I associate
with the use of SES preferences comes from their smaller size; Wald
seems to assume that I propose simply replacing existing racial preferences with similar SES preferences. I do not. 94 Still, Wald was not the
Id. at 651 tbl.8.
91.
92. Calculations by the author from the CALE data; original data available from the author.
93. CALE, supranote 1, at 665-66 (emphasis added).
94. As I have written many times, and repeat again in CALE (see page 666), the mismatch
effect is not caused by racial preferences but by large preferences. If law schools instituted SES
preferences on the scale currently used for blacks and American Indians, this would have the same
counterproductive effects on low-SES students that are currently experienced by those racial minorities. But I think it quite unlikely that any school would ever extend widespread SES preferences on
the scale of many current racial preferences. This is, in large part, because one can achieve substan-
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only commentator to interpret my observation about "invisibility" as a
strong claim, so I am grateful to him for highlighting the issue and giving
me an opportunity to clarify my views. More importantly, Wald is raising intrinsically interesting issues.
On most of these matters, I completely agree with Wald. We agree
that any preference system needs to vigilantly monitor the academic outcomes of beneficiaries, and that admissions systems should be modified,
or effective academic support instituted (and itself monitored for results)
if preferenced students are performing poorly. We also agree that financial support is vital, and perhaps special orientation programs are important to contribute to the success of students who will have few role models from their own past to help them decipher the culture of law school
and the legal profession.
I do not believe, as Wald fears I do, that students and faculty will be
unaware of the greater class diversity in the student body, or that all or
even most low-SES students will seamlessly "pass" as elite and privileged. Like Wald, I think those would be both unlikely and undesirable
outcomes. As I point out in Part I, low-SES students are much more
likely to bring different attitudes and viewpoints to law school than their
affluent peers. These different views will come out in class and hallway
discussions, as will the greater range of life experiences and hardships in
the more diverse student body. This is all very much to the good.
Thus, in our assessment of the failings of the current affirmative action system, and in our values and goals, Wald and I seem to be as one.
Our disagreements mainly lie in two matters that are not values but rather
empirical judgments: first, just how "visible" SES status is at law school,
and second, how much low-SES students are handicapped simply by virtue of their background in their legal careers. Wald provides little empirical evidence on these points, and I think the available evidence supports contrary views.
Careful surveys that ask individuals to place themselves in the SES
hierarchy find a relatively low correlation between objectively-measured
SES and self-identified SES.9 ' That is, even though SES has very powerful effects on many life outcomes in the United States, Americans are not
terribly class-conscious. This carries over into law school. Low-SES
tial SES diversity with small preferences (see the analysis in Part I, as well as the UCLA law school
experiment, where the school achieved very high SES diversity with preferences that were, on average, one-fifth the size of its earlier racial preferences for blacks and American Indians. The smaller
preferences, as I tried to make clear in CALE, are an important contributor to the lower visibility of
SES preference recipients.
95. For example, the General Social Survey asks respondents questions (e.g., about education,
occupation and income) that allow us to assign them an SES score. It also asks them a couple of
questions about how they would describe their own "class" (e.g., "working," "middle," "uppermiddle"). If we rank-order these self-assigned classes, they correlate poorly with the objective measure of SES (correlations are generally under .25). For the source data, see supra note 59.
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students do not perceive higher levels of student tension than other students. I doubt that any law professor or student can pick out low-SES
students with anything approaching the accuracy with which they can
make racial classifications. When UCLA was at the zenith of its SES
diversity efforts, there were no visible signs of class hostility, and study
groups appeared to be far more integrated across class lines than they had
ever been across racial lines (though these last observations are based on
very casual empiricism). Moreover, UCLA's historically highest bar
passage rate was achieved by its most socioeconomically diverse classthe class of 2000 that I wrote about in 1998. All of these things imply
that "stigma" and segregation is not likely to be as severe with a system
of modest class preferences as it is with current, large racial preferences.
The question of how SES affects the careers of lawyers is fascinating and important. As it happens, my colleague Jane Yakowitz and I recently completed a major study of how well law school eliteness, law
school grades, and social class predict success as a lawyer.9 7 We found
that law school performance (as measured by grades) has the largest impact on outcomes, and that its impact has grown over time. Law school
eliteness has a somewhat less important, and diminishing effect. Social
class was undeniably quite important at one point-certainly as late as
the 1950s 9 8-but its significance has declined over time and is undetectable in contemporary datasets. 99 This is completely consistent with the
anecdotal evidence from practicing lawyers. Social stratification within
the legal profession was once endemic, but attitudes and practices with
respect to race, religion, and class have all progressed remarkably over
the past forty years. Because of these changed attitudes, low-SES lawyers are no longer handicapped, to any measureable degree, in pursuing
their careers, including careers at elite law firms. Ironically, the barriers
to class mobility for would-be lawyers are not in the marketplace, but in
higher education.
C. Knocking Down a Few Over-the-Top Claims
In most of this reply article, I have responded to the more critical
essays indirectly, by elaborating on the available research, suggesting
new ways of looking at old debates, and emphasizing areas of common
ground. In some cases, however, fundamental views of particular critics
are based on mistaken evidence, and it would be counterproductive to let
those claims pass without rebuttal. This section dissects some of those
claims.
96. The UCLA class of 2000 had a bar passage rate of 90% on the July 2000 California bar
exam. Its bar passage rate on the prior three July exams-the last three years of conventional racebased affirmative action-had averaged under 82%.
97. Sander & Yakowitz, supra note 45.
Id. at 7.
98.
99. Id. at tbl. 11 and accompanying text.
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For example, in explaining his skepticism about class-based admissions preferences, Richard Lempert gives a dismissive account of the
UCLA Law School experiment in using SES preferences after Proposition 209 went into effect in 1997:
[T]he students enrolled through this program were overwhelmingly
Asian, who benefited from the fact that their parents who were often
immigrants raised in other cultures who had limited formal education
and resided in relatively impoverished if culturally rich immigrant
communities... .only five black students enrolled ...and Hispanic enrollment was also way down. Because of these outcomes the faculty
decided to discontinue the experiment.,too
Lempert says he got these facts from an oral presentation he heard
some years ago. Probably his anonymous, oral source was misinformed;
possibly Lempert's memory is faulty; what we know for sure is that his
facts are wrong. Out of 269 applicants admitted to UCLA Law School in
1997 with SES preferences, only fifty, or 19%, were Asian.o01 Over the
prior seven admissions cycles at UCLA-before the SES program began-Asians had made up an average of 15.5% of admitted students.10
Asians thus did only slightly better under the SES system than under
conventional admissions; it is wildly inaccurate to suggest that AsianAmericans were the "overwhelming" beneficiaries of the program. Hispanics made up 17% of those admitted with SES preferences; they accounted for 9.8% of overall admissions in the prior seven cycles. 03
Blacks made up 5.2% of those admitted with SES preferences. UCLA's
black and Hispanic enrollment numbers were hurt some because the SES
preferences we used were smaller than our traditional racial preferences;
thus our black admittees, in particular, had competing offers from more
elite schools.10 4 Nonetheless, UCLA's black enrollment was ten students-not five, as Lempert claims. Furthermore, black and Hispanic
enrollment combined made up 12.8% of the first-year class 0 5-a remarkable achievement in the first year of a regime that used no racial
preferences. The faculty did not "abandon" the SES experiment after one
year; it shifted instead to a system of using subjective rather than objec-

100. Lempert, supra note 77, at 19-20.
101.
Richard H. Sander, Experimenting with Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 472,496-97 (1997).
102. Id.
103. Id. Average enrollments of minorities during the six years before Prop 209 went into
effect were 9.7% black, 14.1% Hispanic, and 16.7% Asian.
104. This point is elaborated in Sander, supra note 101, at 492.
105. Id. The enrollment figures can be independently verified in a number of sources, such as
the admissions statistics compiled by the University of California Office of the President (copy on
file with the author).
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tive evaluations of socioeconomic disadvantage,10 6 which (as some of us
warned) did lead to significant declines in minority enrollment.
Deirdra Bowen makes some inaccurate claims about law school racial preferences and black enrollment. She claims, without any direct
evidence, that "it is really only in [the] top ten law schools that one finds
the most aggressive use of affirmative action."' 0 7 This is not true; as I
showed in Systemic Analysis, very large racial preferences are used in
every tier of American law schools except among the "historically minority" schools. 0 8 Indeed, the very top law schools tend to have more
black and Hispanic students with small preferences because these
schools, unlike all others, do not have their top minority candidates suctioned up by more elite schools.' 09
Bowen also claims that black and Mexican-American enrollments
in law schools have been eroding away over the past fifteen years." 0 She
does have a source for this claim: Conrad Johnson, a law professor at
Columbia who conducted a study in collaboration with the Society of
American Law Teachers (SALT)."' Unfortunately, Professor Johnson's
study was bogus: he made a variety of research errors that invalidated
nearly all of his results. The Law School Admissions Council issued a
statement disclaiming Johnson's results," 2 and even SALT backed away
from the study. In point of fact, black law school enrollment rose some
from 1992-94 to 2006-08, and Hispanic enrollments (of which MexicanAmericans make up the largest share) jumped a dramatic 38%. It is
equally untrue that black law students are rejected from law schools at
"double" the white rate; because of racial preferences, blacks are many

Under the objective system, UCLA measured four "household" and three "neighborhood"
106.
characteristics of each applicant, and used an algorithm to assess overall socioeconomic disadvantage. Under the subjective system (which, in my judgment, was less effective), admissions officers
read essays and looked at each individual's reported statistics, and developed an intuitive judgment
about socioeconomic disadvantage.
107.
Deirdre M. Bowen, Meeting Across the River: Why Affirmative Action Needs Race &
Class Diversity, 88 DENV. U. L. REv. 751, 768 (2011).
108. Systemic Analysis, supra note 40, at 416. Using the Bar Passage Study data, I calculated
the black-white gap as measured by a standard academic index; the gap was 170 points among the
most elite schools; in the next four tiers, the gap was, respectively, 174 points, 202 points, 165
points, and 172 points. Only in the sixth tier, of historically minority schools, was the gap significantly smaller.
109. See id. at 417.
110.
Bowen, supra note 107, at 769-70.
111.
See id.
112.
See Statement from Stephen T. Schreiber, Exec, Vice President, Law School Admissions
Council (Jan. 14, 2010) (on file with author) available at http://www.saltlaw.org/userfiles. Unfortunately, Johnson's inaccurate findings got wide play in a January issue of the New York Times. See
Tamar Levin, Law School Admissions Lag Among Minorities,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/07/education/07law.html. When I wrote to Tamar Lewin, the
author of the Times article, pointing out the inaccuracies, she expressed "hope" that the Times "will
do a better job" next time. No published correction was forthcoming. Email from Tamar Lewin, New
York Times Correspondent, to the author (February 2, 2010) (on file with author).
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times more likely to be admitted at nearly every American law school
than are whites with comparable credentials' 13
Near the conclusion of CALE, I write "In the age of Obama, there is
abundant evidence that upper-middle-class minorities have made dramatic gains over the past fifty years, and experience genuine access to
mainstream American institutions. There are still significant problems
for these groups . . . but in most ways the landscape has been trans-

formed since 1960.',114 In a confusing passage, Arin Reeves misquotes
me and implies that I believe that Barack Obama's election, by itself,
demonstrates that full racial equality has been achieved in America. In
fact, I advance neither the premise nor the conclusion Reeves suggests.
Like Eugene Robinson and Ellis Cose, I see President Obama's election
as a symbol and metaphor of black progress, but not, by itself, a fact
upon which any particular racial policy should be built. The story of how
racial disparities have evolved, and what this evolution implies for law
school admissions policies, is complex, and much of CALE and this essay aim to provide a coherent version of this story.
Reeves makes a related point that requires comment. She suggests
that Franklin Roosevelt's election to the presidency in 1932 said as much
about public attitudes towards disability as Barack Obama's election in
113. See Systemic Analysis, supranote 40, at 409; Jane Yakowitz & Richard H. Sander, Lifting
the Veil on Law School Admissions, (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Much of
Bowen's article seems to either miss the point of my arguments in CALE, or insinuates, without
providing evidence, that I'm misleading readers. For example, she writes that my discussion of
admissions at the University of Missouri at Columbia ("UMC") "indicts students of color. . . .
Sander goes into great detail offering the gradation of scores and the odds that a white student was
admitted within a certain range, but does not offer the same data regarding students of color." There
are two misrepresentations here. The point of my discussion of UMC's admissions is not to "indict"
black students, but to give the reader insight into both the mechanical use of race by law schools
admissions officers and the focus of these officers on admitting those blacks with the highest scores,
not the blacks who would most enhance "diversity" at the school. I use fewer categories in discussing black admissions at UMC than white admissions, because there were only two relevant categories for blacks in the admissions cycle I discuss: 93% of blacks with an academic index above 44
(UMC's scale) were admitted, and 100% of blacks with an academic index below 44 were rejected
(as noted in CALE, whites were rarely admitted with index scores below 58). Bowen goes on, "The
reader is left to wonder, how many black students applied? What were their scores? Were they all
lower than the white students? Without providing this information, Sander gives an impression that
all black students were mismatched or robbed more qualified white students of seats at UMC."
Bowen, supra note 108, at 781-82. 1hope most readers recognize that none of my work on affirmative action is concerned with whether white students are "robbed" admissions places, but rather with
how well a school's diversity objectives, and the preferenced students themselves, are served by
highly mechanical processes that focus on a single factor (race) and ignore the academic disparities
that result. Bowen (like any reader) is welcome to examine the data from UMC (or dozens of other
datasets our research gmup has collected). The data about UMC offered in CALE is sufficient to
make the point developed there. As to Bowen's other concems, here is some additional data: in the
admissions cycle I examined, UMC had forty-one black applicants for UMC's class of about one
hundred fifty. Fourteen were admitted, and seven enrolled. The median black applicant had an
index of 42. Many white applicants had even lower scores, but these were all rejected; the median
white applicant had an index of 60. The blacks who ended up enrolling from this group had a median index of 54, about eight points lower than the class median and enough, I believe, to put them at
serious risk of mismatch and bar failure.
114. CALE, supranote 1,at 668.
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2008 said about public attitudes towards race' 15 (the implication is that
prejudices simmered undiminished towards, respectively, the handicapped and blacks, despite the elections). This analogy is utterly fallacious. FDR went to great lengths to hide from the public the extent of his
disability, and he lived in an era when the press was willing to respect his
privacy (or collaborate with his deception, if you prefer). The public
knew he had suffered from polio, but it was not generally realized until
after his death that he was essentially paralyzed from the waist down.
FDR's advisers agreed, and he apparently did as well, that the public
would not accept a seriously handicapped President. 16 The Obama case
is radically different; Obama's race was a central fact of his biography,
and for legions of his supporters it was a central virtue of his candi-

dacy. 117

PART IV. REVISITING

THE "MISMATCH" DEBATE

One of my central goals in this symposium was to show that the
need for reform in law school diversity policies goes far beyond the
problem of "mismatch" that I wrote about in 2004, 2005, and 2006.
Nonetheless, the question of whether and how any admissions preference
harms its intended beneficiaries looms over this discussion, and my reply
would be incomplete without a discussion of the mismatch issue.
Moreover, this is a particularly good time to examine the state of
debate on the mismatch question. 2011 has seen the publication, in the
American Economic Review, of results from what could be described as
the first large-scale, randomized experiment on the mismatch effect."'
The K-12 version of the mismatch debate is the controversy over "tracking"--that is, whether students should be grouped by "ability" or taught
with completely heterogeneous peers. The AER study reported on a
World Bank-funded experiment in Kenya, in which thousands of students were randomly assigned to "tracked" classrooms or more heterogeneous classrooms. The authors found dramatic improvements in learn115.
Arin N. Reeves, Race as a Red Herring? The Logical Irrelevance of the Race vs. Class
Debate, 88 DENV. U. L. REv. 835, 842 (2011).
116.
This issue is thoroughly discussed and documented in JONATHAN ALTER, THE DEFINING
MOMENT: FDR'S HUNDRED DAYS AND THE TRIUMPH OF HOPE (2007).

117.
Helene Cooper, Black Voters' Supportfor Obama Is Steady andStrong, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
26, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/27/us/politics/obamas-support-amongblacks-remains-strong.htmlpagewanted=all ("Beyond issues, many African-Americans feel an
emotional connection to Mr. Obama that seems unshakable, saying that nothing can compare with
seeing someone who looks like them in the White House."). Tim Groseclose discusses in detail
research that suggests that to the extent race factored into the 2008 presidential election, it was a net
benefit for Obama. TIM GROSECLOSE, LEFT TURN: How LIBERAL MEDIA BIAS DISTORTS THE
AMERICAN MIND 85-86 (2011).

118.
Esther Duflo, Pascaline Dupas & Michael Kremer, Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and
the Impact of Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya, 101 AM. ECON. REV.
1739 (2011). Duflo won the 2010 John Bates Clark medal, now given annually to the American
economist under the age of forty judged to have made the most significant contribution to economic
thought and knowledge.
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ing among the tracked students-improvements that occurred across the
spectrum of students. Though there are, of course, vast differences between Kenyan schoolchildren and American law students, it is noteworthy that all of the empirical implications of mismatch theory, including
findings about teachers "pitching" the level of instruction to the preparation level of students, held robustly in the context of a rigorous experiment.
Closer to home, Duke economists recently released the second in a
series of studies" 9 that examine in detail the effects of preferences on
undergraduates at Duke; the research has tested and found strong support
for a host of 'mismatch' phenomena. So far as I know, this innovative
and thorough research has gone completely unanswered by mismatch
critics.
This year has also seen the formal retraction of earlier antimismatch findings published by Katherine Barnes, a law professor at the
University of Arizona who has been one of the half-dozen leading empirical critics of mismatch.120 Barnes has conceded that her earlier analyses were mistaken;121 her revised analysis of data from the Bar Passage
Study (the main data source for all the major analyses, to date, of law
school mismatch) leads her to conclude that eliminating affirmative action would have no measureable impact on the number of black lawyers.
In Barnes's model, she assumes that eliminating racial preferences would
reduce the number of blacks entering law school by 21%, so her finding
that the number of black lawyers produced by this system would not
change implies that individual blacks are doing much better in the system. My colleagues and I calculate that her revised model implies that,
without preferences, the rate at which black law students become lawyers
goes up by 28%, and the number of black law students who fail to become lawyers drops by fifty-five percent. 122 This would seem to be a
striking confirmation of the mismatch hypothesis, and it is certainly a
striking change of position by someone who had been a very harsh critic
of mismatch.
Of far more significance is the recently completed research of Doug
Williams, the Wilson Professor of Economics (and department chair) at
Sewanee: The University of the South. In two related papers, Williams
119. Peter Arcidiacono, Esteban M. Aucejoz, Hanming Fang, Kenneth I. Spenner, Does Affirmative Action Lead to Mismatch? A New Test and Evidence, QUANTITATIVE ECON. (forthcoming
2011); Arcidiacono et al., supra note 47.
120. Barnes's originally advanced her critique in Katherine Y. Barnes, Is Affirmative Action
Responsible for the Achievement Gap Between Black and White Law Students?, 101 Nw. U. L. REV.
1759 (2007).
Katherine Y. Barnes, Is Affirmative Action Responsiblefor the Achievement Gap Between
121.
Black and White Law Students? A Correction, A Lesson, and an Update, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 791
(2011).
Doug Williams, Richard Sander, Marc Luppino & Roger Bolus, Revisiting Law School
122.
Mismatch: A Comment on Barnes, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 813 (2011).
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has painstakingly analyzed the methods of every significant empirical
critique of law school mismatch.12 3 (It was through this work that the
mistakes committed by Barnes first came to light.) In every instance,
Williams's research disclosed one or multiple research flaws that accounted for the original author's conclusions against mismatch. Using
each researcher's methods, Williams found that more defensible analyses
of the underlying data showed evidence that leaned towards a mismatch
interpretation, sometimes overwhelmingly so. Williams's findings are
straightforward and easy to understand and replicate. They leave very
little ground left for any critic of the mismatch effect to stand upon.
Yet the current state of knowledge about law school mismatch is not
reflected in institutional behavior. Professor Malamud writes that
"Sander has made it impossible (and rightfully so) to ignore [the possibility of mismatch effects]."l 24 I wish she were right. It is true that almost all legal academics are aware of the fireworks occasioned by my
earlier research, but it is emphatically not true that the legal academy is
engaged in any even-handed deliberation about the mismatch issue. Indeed, it would be more accurate to say that, at the major institutions of
the legal academy-such as the Law School Admissions Council, the
American Bar Foundation, and the American Association of Law
Schools-it is considered extremely bad form to take the mismatch hypothesis seriously. If the topic of mismatch is brought up at all, it must
quickly be cast aside in a tone both conclusory and dismissive. The determination to ignore the mismatch issue, and to ostracize those who
think the problem is real, is manifest. How else can one explain why, in
the six years since Systemic Analysis appeared, none of these institutions
have released new data relevant to assessing the mismatch issue or the
problem of minority bar passage? Why have none of them empanelled
neutral social scientists to evaluate and report on the mismatch debate?
On this issue, many otherwise distinguished academics have fostered an
environment in which data is inaccessible and honest debate is profoundly chilled. Thus, I can think of at least one highly-regarded researcher in legal academia who lost a job, at least in part, for not regarding the mismatch issue with sufficient wariness. Other academics regularly tell me of their concerns about being punished professionally for
engaging in mismatch research or even for investigating minority bar
123. Doug Williams, Does Affirmative Action Create Educational Mismatches in Law
Schools?, (Working Paper 2009), available at http://econ.duke.edu/~hfl4/ERID/Williams.pdf. This
paper was presented at the American Law and Economics annual meeting in 2010, and revised
version in 2011).
124.
Deborah C. Malamud, Class Privilege in Legal Education: A Response to Sander, 88
DENv. U. L. REv. 729, 730 n.2 (2011). Her full language on this point follows: "In my own work, I
have acknowledged that the diversity rationale pushes institutions towards a focus on their own
institutional goals, rather than on the consequences of affirmative action for the lives of its intended
beneficiaries [citation omitted]. I believe Sander has made it impossible (and rightfully so) to ignore
those consequences-although I am more persuaded by his critics on the merits of the question of
what those consequences are in fact."
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passage outcomes at their schools. One distinguished (and apolitical)
academic offered to help me with mismatch research so long as his name
was never attached to the work. I have many times been invited to give
lectures or publish articles, only to have the invitations withdrawn when
colleagues of the person making the invitation learn of it and protest.
Indeed, the Stanford Law Review staff who published Systemic Analysis
were pressured into publishing only critical response pieces, even though
distinguished academics who (in article outlines submitted to the law
review) offered more balanced assessments sought to participate.12 5 A
2008 academic conference largely devoted to the issue of raising minority bar passage rates was undoubtedly precipitated in large part by my
mismatch research, but made no attempt to address mismatch in a serious
way.1 26 The United States Civil Rights Commission conducted hearings
on the mismatch effect in 2006, issued a report containing a careful dissection of Systemic Analysis and the major critiques, and concluded that
the problem was a potentially serious one, requiring corrective measures
similar to the transparency recommendation I advanced in Part II. 12 But
the legal education establishment has completely ignored the report. Officials asked about the mismatch hypothesis almost automatically react
the way several contributors to this symposium did: they say something
to the effect that "it's been dealt with" and cite critiques that have, in
truth, been all but discredited. It is hard to imagine legal education officialdom ignoring any other civil rights issue in this way.
Coherent debate about law school mismatch has proven difficult in
the legal academy for reasons that are, in some degree, understandable.
Obviously, many of those who have been deeply invested in affirmative
action throughout their professional lives find it almost impossible to
contemplate the idea that preference programs at law schools systematically injure the vulnerable people they purport to help. Moreover, serious
discussion of mismatch usually involves discussion of the size of racial
preferences, the poor performance of preferenced students in law school,
and the abysmal disparities in bar passage rates across racial lines. These
facts are upsetting to many academics; some of their colleagues want to
avoid discussion simply because they know that others will be upset. Still
others conclude that the topic is so emotional that rational discussion is
impossible and that raising the subject is therefore pointless. All of this
helps to explain why the principal scholarly reaction to the mismatch
125. An editor at Stanford Law Review told me of this decision; proposed essays by James
Lindgren and William Henderson were among the more balanced responses that the journal bypassed to focus only on very critical pieces.
Bar Exam Passage Conference, held in Chicago in October 2008, and sponsored by the
126.
here:
It
is described
Council.
School
Admissions
the
Law
and
ABA
http://apps.americanbar.org/legaled/calendar/conferences/Bar/20Passage/barpassageagenda.html.
U.S. COMMIsSIoN ON CIVIL RIGHTS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS:
127.
A BRIEFING BEFORE THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 143 (2006), available at

http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/AALSreport.pdf.
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hypothesis has been dominated by diatribes-some clothed in empiricism, some not-rather than dispassionate analysis. Robust debate, release of new relevant data, deliberative assessments by non-partisan
scholars-none of these have been in evidence.12 8
Nonetheless, the evidence that the mismatch effect is real, and is
particularly acute in law schools, continues to grow. It touches upon and
affects all of the issues raised in this symposium. It is thus appropriate to
summarize in an accessible way why every legal academic needs to ponder the problem. In the next few pages I lay out why the three different
ways of approaching the mismatch issue all lead to a common conclusion
that now goes unrefuted.
A. The Conceptual Demonstration
First is the empirical paradox laid out in Systemic Analysis.12 9 Black
law students perform as well in law school, or very nearly as well, as do
whites with similar entering credentials (LSAT, UGPA, and undergraduate college). They also perform as well on the bar exam as do whites
with similar credentials and law school grades. Yet if we predict bar performance based on pre-law credentials (LSAT and UGPA), a huge gap
opens up between blacks and whites. How can this be? According to
mismatch theory, the explanation lies in the fact that law school racial
preferences cause blacks to be clustered at the bottom of the credential
distribution at the great majority of law schools. Although blacks receiving preferences get the grades predicted by their credentials at these
schools, these grades are so low that they signify (based on later bar performance) that little learning is going on. Most whites with comparable
credentials go to much less elite schools, get better grades, learn more,
and thus do far better on the bar. Confirming this pattern, we know that
at virtually all law schools, getting grades that put one's class rank in the
bottom ten percent of one's law school class (where most blacks receiving preferences end up) translates into terrible bar passage outcomes. The
mismatch hypothesis-that students with credentials far below the class
mainstream learn less, because the instruction is not "aimed" at them,
than they would learn at another school where their credentials better
match the mainstream-can explain all of these observed facts. No one

It is striking, for example, that law students (often minority students) at Harvard, Stanford,
128.
New York University, Michigan, Northwestern, and Duke have organized forums or debates on law
school mismatch issues. So have nearly all of the major organizations of black lawyers. But no law
faculty at these schools (or any other "top 10" law school) has organized any kind of debate or forum
exploring the evidence for and against the mismatch effect.
This paragraph summarizes an argument laid out in Systemic Analysis, supra note 40, at
129.
425-54, and which is revisited and elaborated upon in Sander, supra note 48, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1963, 1966-78 (2005).
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in the entire mismatch debate has put forth any coherent alternative account. 130
Indeed, few of the critics have even attempted to explain these facts.
Ayres and Brooks, near the end of their critique, half-heartedly suggest
that "stereotype threat" might account for the patterns. 13 1 But stereotype
threat implies underperformance on tests where rumors of inferiority
distract students and undermine performance; it is thought to be most
serious on standardized exams. How then, can one explain that the blackwhite grade gap is as large in legal writing classes (a finding demonstrated from multiple data sources) as it is in timed law school exams or
the LSAT?l 3 2 Katherine Barnes offers a closely-related argument: she
believes that discrimination against blacks causes lower performance.
But this account fails, for the same reason-discrimination would show
up in lower-than-expected grades in law school for blacks, or lower-thanexpected bar passage rates. Neither phenomenon appears in the data.
Moreover, research on older white students, who receive significant
preferences at many law schools, suggest that they, too, end up with low
grades and worse bar passage outcomes at schools where they face a
credential deficit.133 The fact that in six years of discussion, no one has
articulated an alternative explanation to account for even most of these
facts is, by itself, compelling evidence supportive of the mismatch hypothesis.
B. The Simple Empiricism of ComparingLaw Schools
The idea that mismatch might be occurring at law schools first occurred to me when, at UCLA in the early 1990s, I learned that black
graduates from the school often had a fifty percent failure rate on the
California Bar. California's exam is a hard one, but even with preferences, UCLA's black students during this period had very respectable
130. The only part of this logic disputed by the critics, to my knowledge, is the first statement-that black grades in law school show little evidence of underperfonnance. But my claim is
backed not only by my own analyses, but by a series of authoritative LSAC studies (which again, to
my knowledge, no one has disputed), showing very small levels of black underperformance in law
school. My own research suggests that when such studies control for undergraduate college attended
by students, even this slight underperformance goes away.
131.
Ian Ayres & Richard Brooks, Does Affirmative Action Reduce the Number of Black Lawyers? 57 STAN. L. REv. 1807, 1838-40 (2005). Ayres and Brooks cite no actual evidence of stereotype threat in law schools and concede that "we do not have a compelling theory as to what is causing" lower rates of black achievement on the bar. In their piece, they simply sidestep the logic of the
argument summarized here. With no sense of self-irony, Ayres and Brooks suggest that the historically black law schools are good places to see where things are going right for black students. Of
course, it is at these schools that mismatch is minimized, and it is these schools that Ayres and
Brooks inexplicably omit from one of their central mismatch analyses!
132. Ayres and Brooks suggest that perhaps stereotype threat affects every intellectual task
undertaken by law students; but this proves too much, since it implies that black law students will go
on to become black lawyers whose performance is hindered throughout their careers by stereotype
threat. Moreover, this entire explanation seems to hinge on substantial black underperformance in
law school grades, for which there is no evidence.
133. Christian DuBois, "Too Old for Law School?" (2005 working paper on file with author).
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credentials. Based on their credentials, they should have been passing the
bar at a rate above the state average; instead they were often fifteen
points below it. The disparity was worse if one simply focused on students (of any race) admitted with particularly large preferences. For example, students admitted to UCLA's Class of 2005 with large preferences (that is, they had LSAT scores more than ten points below the
school average) had a first-time California bar passage rate in July 2005
of 44%; graduates of lower-ranked Southwestern Law School, who had
an overall median LSAT about the same as the "large preference" UCLA
students, had a first-time bar passage rate in 2005 of 66%. This suggests
that "mismatch" was lowering the bar passage rate among "large preference" UCLA students by twenty-two points, or a full third. Almost certainly, the effect was even larger, because the Southwestern bar passage
rate would itself be misleadingly depressed by the school's own "mismatched" students. At UCLA, students admitted with LSAT scores at
the school median had bar passage rates of 96% (far above the school
average of 89%), so a student with the median LSAT at Southwestern
may well have had a bar passage rate of 75% or 80%. In any case, it
seems clear that students who would have had very good prospects of
passing the bar at Southwestern had much worse prospects at UCLA. 134
This disparity is what we would expect if the mismatch hypothesis
is true. Are there alternate explanations? One idea often advanced is that
lower-ranked schools are more focused on "teaching to the bar," so their
pass rates are artificially inflated at the expense of a well-rounded legal
education. Thus, the low black bar passage rate at UCLA might simply
reflect a broader and better legal education. But this explanation flounders on the data; analyses of bar takers always show a positive effect of
law school eliteness upon bar passage rates. 135 Probably some, or even
all, of this eliteness advantage can be accounted for by the higher unobserved credentials of elite school students,136 but the fact remains that no
evidence exists for the idea that lower-ranked schools do a systematically
better job of preparing their students for the bar.
The other possible hypothesis is that nonwhite students (who make
up a disproportionate share of the "large preference" students at UCLA)
simply do worse on the bar when we hold credentials constant. But as we
have seen, that is clearly not true; race itself explains none of the bar
passage disparities. Once again, it is hard to think of a plausible alternative to the mismatch account.
134. The UCLA data for this class comes from a spreadsheet prepared by the UCLA Records
Office, and available from the author; data from Southwestern comes from the ABA-LSAC Official
Guide to ABA-Approved Law Schoools, 2004 edition (2003) at 663 (for Southwestern student
credentials), and State Bar of California, General Statistics Report, July 2005 California Bar Examination (2006).
See, e.g., Systemic Analysis, supra note 40, at 444.
135.
136. See, e.g., Sander, supra note 48, at 1972 (discussing the unobserved credentials problem,
which will make bar passage performance at elite schools appear stronger).
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The UCLA example was provocative, but it was a single case and
therefore could be dismissed as a fluke. For this reason, I did not include
it, even as an example, in Systemic Analysis. But since that time, detailed
data has become available for two other, quite different law schools: the
University of Michigan and George Mason University. Do similar patterns hold at these schools?
Through a series of public records requests, my research associates
and I were able to assemble data on the graduation and first-time bar
passage outcomes (for Virginia) of ten cohorts of students at George
Mason (GMU)-those matriculating from 1998 through 2007.137 The
sample is modest, partly because GMU's black enrollment was generally
small and partly because some GMU graduates do not take the Virginia
bar exam, but we nonetheless have complete data on forty-one black
entering students. Among this entire group, only 29% graduated from
GMU and passed the Virginia bar on their first attempt. These GMU
blacks had a median LSAT score of 151 and a median UGPA of 3.17.
Compare these students with those at predominantly black Howard
University School of Law, just a few miles from the GMU campus.
Howard students in 2001-04 had a median LSAT score of about 151 and
a median UGPA of about 3.12, nearly identical to the GMU blacks. The
proportion of entering students graduating and passing the New York bar
on the first attempt was an average of 60% during the 2001-04 period,
about double the GMU rate.' 38 Once again, a cohort of students with
similar credentials apparently had much better outcomes when they attended a school where their credentials were close to the school median.
It is true that this comparison is far from exact; we do not know
who within the Howard class is taking the New York bar, and the New
York bar during the period of comparison had a slightly higher first-time
bar passage rate than did the Virginia bar. But I do not think that any
combination of plausible assumptions can explain away even a large
fraction of the vast difference in black outcomes between the "mismatched" students at GMU and the generally well-matched students at
Howard.
A third example, the University of Michigan Law School (UMLS),
is particularly interesting, not only because UMLS policies were the subject of Grutter v. Bollinger,13 9 but because studies of UMLS graduates
137. Why George Mason? Because administrators there were uniquely willing to provide
detailed individual-level data on outcomes, so long as our request came from a resident of Virginia
(as required under the state's public record laws). This analysis is based on the George Mason
Disclosed Database for 1995-2007 and is available from the author.
138. See AMER. BAR ASS'N, ABA-LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS
(2002-2005 editions). I averaged Howard data on attrition and New York bar passage over four
years. For the reasons discussed supra, text accompanying note 138, this is almost surely an underestimate of the success rate of Howard students with credentials at the class "median".
139.
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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have played an outsized role in the debate over the effects of law school
affirmative action. Richard Lempert and his two coauthors (David
Chambers and Terry Adams) published, to much acclaim, a 2000 study
that painted a generally rosy picture of the post-graduate careers of
UMLS's minority students.14 0 In particular, the study purported to demonstrate that virtually all of UMLS's black students passed the bar exam.
Lempert even took the stand in Grutter and testified that the bar passage
rate of UMLS blacks was very close to one hundred percent.141 This assertion, which Lempert frequently invoked in one form or another,142 was
very salient in the debate over Systemic Analysis. How could the mismatch effect be a real problem if, at the one school where minority outcomes had been most carefully studied, bar passage was a non-existent
problem for minority students?
I was always highly skeptical of Lempert's claim because it did not
line up with any of the other available data. As discussed above, the most
comprehensive data source on the bar outcomes of individual (anonymous) students was the Bar Passage Study (BPS), the LSAC's longitudinal survey that had tracked some twenty-seven thousand first-year students in the 1990s from their entry into law school through the beginning
of their professional careers.143 Law schools are not identified in the
BPS, but the UMLS was certainly grouped either in 'Cluster 4' or 'Cluster 5', the two clusters that contain the most selective law schools. At
those schools, according to the BPS, nearly 30% of black students fail
the bar on their first attempt, and over 15% never pass. A substantial
number of blacks graduating from these schools never attempt the bar,
and thus also do not become lawyers. Thus, for Lempert to be right-for
UMLS black graduates to essentially never fail the bar-something extraordinarily would have to be happening in Michigan.
In the fall of 2005, I was able to obtain aggregated bar records from
the State of Michigan, which reported the overall bar passage rates of
bar-takers from each of Michigan's law schools for each year from 1975
to 1995, a period roughly contemporaneous with the period covered by
the Lempert et al study.144 The data was not broken down by race, but it
did show that over the twenty-year period, all UMLS graduates who took
140. Lempert, Chambers & Adams, supra note 50, at 395 (suggesting minority bar passage rate
varies from 95% to 98%).
141.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 862-63 (E.D. Mich. 2001) ("almost all" minority graduates pass a bar exam).
142. U.S. COMMissioN ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 127, at 9, 52 ("virtually every minority
Michigan graduate passed the bar").
The BPS has, on the one hand, wonderfully detailed data on individual students, including
143.
detailed surveys completed at various points during the student's progression through law school. On
the other hand, as discussed further below, the BPS obscures vital data for comparative analyses:
schools are grouped into six broad 'clusters'-it is not even possible to know for sure which schools
are put in which cluster-and state bars are grouped into broad geographic areas.
The UMLS Bar data was supplied by Tim Raubinger, Assistant Secretary, Michigan
144.
Board of Law Examiners, in the fall of 2005 (on file with the author).
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the Michigan bar had a 90.7% first-time bar passage rate. The first-time
rate for all students in the comparable BPS clusters was 91.2%. This
suggested that there was nothing unusual about UMLS's overall bar performance. Moreover, since the Michigan state data showed a fairly low
rate of success among UMLS students who re-took the bar, Lempert's
claim that essentially all UMLS students passed the bar was implausible.
A few months later, in analyzing data from Michigan alumni surveys, I learned another startling fact: about 60% of UMLS blacks ended
up in the bottom tenth of their class. This was somewhat worse than the
rate at comparable BPS schools (about 50%), and thus pretty much
dashed the idea that UMLS had some special form of academic support
that allowed its black graduates to have unique success on the bar.
Rather, it implied that, if anything, UMLS black graduates would have a
lower first-time bar passage rate than comparable BPS blacks (recall the
BPS black rate at elite schools was 70%).
In September 2006 I wrote about these findings on the Empirical
Legal Studies blog, 145 arguing that the bar success rates Lempert claimed
for UMLS blacks could not possibly be true. Lempert wrote three comments on my blog entry, totaling some seven thousand words! He made
some thoughtful points but mainly avoided the central issue: what did the
University of Michigan's internal records on its graduates say about
black bar passage rates? And why hadn't Lempert and his coauthors examined and reported on this data in the course of a major research project
on the success of UMLS's affirmative action program? Lempert wrote
that it had never occurred to him to inquire about first-time bar passage
rates, and that in any case it would be impossibly difficult to track down
the actual bar outcomes of Michigan graduates. Both claims seemed unbelievable, since every law school I've encountered not only tracks the
bar outcomes of graduates, but regularly generates internal reports on
year-to-year changes. Of course, ordinarily only faculty (like Lempert)
and administrators have access to such data. So how to nail down what
was actually happening?
Happily, fate intervened at this point, assisted by the discovery
process. In November 2006, Michigan voters passed Proposition 2, a
measure (similar to Prop 209 in California) which prohibited the use of
racial preferences by state entities, including the University of Michigan.
A suit to enjoin enforcement of Prop 2 followed,14 6 and the lawyers representing one of the parties in the litigation sought my advice in shaping
discovery requests. Among many other things, we learned that UMLS
145.
Richard Sander, Do Elite Schools Avoid the Mismatch Effect?, EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUDIES (Sept. 22, 2006),
http://www.elsblog.org/theempirical legalstudi/2006/09/do eliteschool.html.
Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 652 F.3d 607 (6th
146.
Cir. 2011).
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did indeed maintain records of how its graduates did on the bar exams of
many states, and we obtained lists, for several cohorts of UMLS graduates, of bar outcomes. By comparing names in these lists to UMLS student facebooks, we could reasonably categorize students by race, and
thus, at last, measure the actual bar performance of UMLS students by
race. 147
The results suggested that UMLS blacks taking a bar exam for the
first time had a 62% pass rate; those taking multiple bar exams had an
eventual success rate of 76%. In other words, UMLS black performance
on the bar was, as we guessed, a little worse than the rate found in the
BPS for similar schools. This finding is, in my view, devastating to
48
It also suggests that
Lempert's study and to his testimony in Grutter.1
UMLS fits the pattern I have discussed with UCLA and George Mason.
Students at a less-elite neighbor of UMLS-Wayne State University
School of Law-have average credentials similar to or a little lower than
those of UMLS blacks, but entering students have an aggregate graduation and first-time bar passage rate (in Michigan) of about 73% (again,
the rate for students at Wayne State with "average" credentials is almost
certainly much higher). Taking attrition at the University of Michigan
into account, conservatively, the comparable figure for black Michigan
students during the same period is 60%.149 This simple comparison thus
suggests that the mismatch effect sharply lowers the success rates of the
purported beneficiaries of affirmative action at UMLS. Rather than being
an exception that confounds mismatch theory, the University of Michigan fits the pattern.
These three case studies of law schools provide easy to understand,
prima facie evidence of the mismatch effect. I submit that any law professor or dean can confirm similar patterns by examining the records of
their own school. Those who disbelieve the mismatch effect have an obligation to explain these patterns in non-mismatch terms. To date, no one
has.

147. One might criticize this method for relying on facebooks to classify students by race. We
had two different graduate students classify the students, and they produced essentially identical
results. Moreover, to the extent our classification of blacks might contain errors (say 10% of those
we classified as black are of another race), that would tend to raise, rather than lower, our estimate of
the group's bar passage rate. Of course, I would also welcome the school to release its own reports
on bar outcomes by race.
148. These results imply that Lempert, Chambers & Adams' study, supra note 50, overlooked
or omitted virtually all the black students-and a very large number of them-who never became
lawyers. Since the whole point of the study was to evaluate the post-graduate outcomes of UMLS's
minority graduates, it is hard to see how this problem does not invalidate all of their results. Note,
however, that Richard Lempert, after reading a draft of this article, vigorously disputed my estimate.
Readers may find additional debate and discussion of this issue at http://www.seaphe.org/.
149. See, e.g., AMER. BAR Ass'N, ABA-LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-APPROVED LAW
SCHOOLS (2002-05 editions). As with the analysis of Howard, supra, I analyzed four years of attrition and bar passage statistics for Wayne State. Because of the small sample size in the disclosed
data, the Michigan estimate applies to blacks taking the bar in all the states disclosed by UMLS.
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C. The Demonstrationthrough StatisticalAnalysis ofBPS Data
Most of the empirical debate about the mismatch effect has focused
on quantitative modeling, rather than the simple intuitive or school-byschool comparisons I have discussed in the last two sections. In this
work, a scholar will typically draw a conceptual inference from the mismatch theory: if mismatch is true, then we should observe such-and-such
empirical regularity in large-scale databases. Over half-a-dozen such
studies in this vein have been completed: by Ayres & Brooks, Yoon &
Rothstein (who published one study and wrote a second), Daniel Ho,
Katherine Barnes (original and revised), Lempert and another group of
coauthors (one published and two unpublished), Doug Williams (two
working papers), and (indirectly) Timothy Clydesdale. 5 0 Many of these
studies conclude that the evidence for the mismatch effect is weak or
nonexistent, and although few legal academics have the quantitative
chops to follow the debate, this collective body of research provides
comfort to those who wish to believe that the mismatch idea can be
safely ignored.
I suggest, however, that anyone who spends some time carefully
reading this body of work, together with the commentaries written by
Williams, 5 ' by me,15 2 and by Williams et al 5 3 will find this research
quite compelling in supporting the mismatch hypothesis. The key to understanding this literature is to keep in mind five methodological issues
that affect all the work to some degree or other:
* The conservative effect of noise. All of these studies have relied
entirely on the Bar Passage Study ("BPS"), which remains the only
large-scale dataset that includes student credentials, law school performance, and bar outcomes for a national sample of students. Unfortunately,
the BPS data is extremely noisy - that is, inexact -- for these analytic

purposes. The "pass" data is more complete than the "fail" data; the only
data on school attended is in the "cluster" variables, which are broad and
overlapping in their measures of school eliteness; there is no data on actual bar scores, but only whether a graduate passed or failed in a group150. Ayres & Brooks, supra note 131; David L. Chambers, Timothy T. Clydesdale, William C.
Kidder & Richard 0. Lempert, The Real Impact of Eliminating Affirmative Action in American Law
Schools: An Empirical Critique of Richard Sander's Study, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1855 (2005); Jesse
Rothstein & Albert H. Yoon, Affirmative Action in Law School Admissions: What Do Racial Preferences Do?, 75 U. CHI. L. REv. 649 (2008); Jesse Rothstein & Albert H. Yoon, Mismatch in Law
at
manuscript),
available
(unpublished
2009)
School
(May
http://gsppi.berkeley.edulfaculty/jrothstein/workingpapers/rothsteinyoonmay2009.pdf, Daniel Ho,
Why Affirmative Action Does Not Cause Black Students to Fail the Bar, 114 YALE L.J. 1997 (2005);
Barnes, supra note 121; Barnes, supra note 122; Williams, supra note 124; Timothy Clydesdale, A
Forked River Runs Through Law School: Toward UnderstandingAge, Gender, Race, and Related
Gaps in Law School Performanceand Bar Passage,29 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 711 (2004).
151.
Williams, supra note 123.
152.
Sander, supra note 47; Richard H. Sander, Mismeasuring the Mismatch: A Reply to Ho,
114 YALE L.J. 2005 (2005).
153. Williams, Sander, Luppino & Bolus, supranote 122.
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ing of states (and bar pass thresholds usually vary significantly within
these groups); we cannot even measure mismatch exactly, since we can't
isolate students within a single school and measure their relative credentials. All of these weaknesses in the data make it more likely that actual
patterns will not stand out; in the context of testing for mismatch, it
means that any mismatch (or anti-mismatch) findings that are statistically
significant are likely to be strong indeed, while findings that are merely
consistent with mismatch (e.g., a coefficient that points in the predicted
direction but is not statistically significant) should not be dismissed.15 4
Selection bias from unobserved variables. A fundamental challenge in measuring mismatch is the problem of "unobserved characteristics." Law school admissions officers base decisions largely on LSAT,
UGPA, and race, but other factors-undergraduate college, writing ability, references, etc.-are important at the margin, and are likely to be
especially important in anomalous admissions decisions (e.g., when
someone with low credentials is admitted to an elite school). Thus, when
we compare Student A at an elite school with Student B at a non-elite
school, even if the two students have the same LSAT and UGPA, it is
very likely that Student A has other, hidden characteristics that make her
a stronger candidate (e.g., Student A got a 3.6 at Harvard, while Student
B got a 3.6 at Ball State). Different techniques for modeling mismatch do
a better or worse job of dealing with this problem, but nearly all models
will incorporate some bias against finding mismatch, because in any
comparison of students from higher-ranked and lower-ranked schools,
the unobserved credentials of those at the lower-ranked schools will tend
to be lower and they are thus handicapped in direct comparisons of outcomes.iss
* Choice of outcome. Different outcome measures are more or less
relevant for assessing "mismatch" per se. Nearly all of the critics of Systemic Analysis focused on whether a student ultimately passed a bar
exam and became a lawyer.156 In these models, someone who takes five
attempts to pass a bar is considered just as successful as someone who
passes on their first attempt. This is a relevant test if one is only interested in whether affirmative action actually reduces the number of minority attorneys (since then one only cares about who ultimately obtains
a license). But it is a very poor measure of whether affirmative action
causes its beneficiaries to learn less in law school. The reason is obvious:
if someone fails the bar on their first attempt, they will spend an enormous amount of time trying to re-educate themselves about the law.
154.
This problem is often referred to as "attenuation" or "regression dilution."
Rothstein & Yoon, supra note 150, at, provides a good discussion of this problem. Ayres
155.
and Brooks acknowledge this problem in motivating their second-choice method, but then discount
the results that flow from their second-choice model.
This is the primary outcome focused upon by Ayres & Brooks, Barnes, Rothstein &
156.
Yoon, and, apparently, Ho.
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They may hire special tutors, buy new study aids, and immerse themselves in their bar preparation course. These are all post-law-school
treatments, so they will tend to counter whatever harms mismatch may
have inflicted during law school. If we are interested in mismatch itself
(which of course we should be interested in), then first-time bar passage
is a more relevant measure.
On the other hand, if we simply measure first-time bar passage for
law graduates, we may create a bias in favor of the mismatch hypothesis.
Suppose, for example, that more-elite school C almost never flunks out
students; it has a 98% graduation rate for matriculants. Less-elite school
D, in contrast, weeds out its weaker students (partly to protect its overall
bar passage rate); it has a 75% graduation rate for matriculants. If we
measure how graduates of these two schools do on the bar, we may create a bias in favor of less-elite school D because that school has weeded
out its weakest matriculants. An appropriate measure of mismatch is
therefore one that considers all law school matriculants, and considers
graduation and first-time bar passage as the successful outcome.15 7
* Paying attention to coefficients. My claim in Systemic Analysis
was that the mismatch effect might explain as much as half of the blackwhite gap in first-time bar passage rates-that is, about fifteen points (the
rest is explained by the broad differences in credentials between blacks
and whites). Suppose that in actually testing mismatch with the BPS, an
analyst considers "eventual" bar passage rather than first-time bar passage. The predicted mismatch effect (in the BPS) is now less than half as
large-perhaps six or seven points. Suppose the technique of the analyst
does not compare someone with "no" mismatch with someone who is
"maximally" mismatched, but compares two people with moderately
different levels of mismatch. The predicted effect might now be only two
or three points. Suppose, finally, that the test being used has a modest
sample size-say two groups of two hundred students.158 What analytic
result would we expect?
Even if no other forms of bias contaminate the results, this test is
not likely to produce a statistically significant result, regardless of
whether mismatch is operating or not. The test, we can say, has been
engineered to fail. It is therefore relevant in discussing mismatch tests
and their results, to think about what coefficients we could reasonably
Williams refers to this as the "smooth passage" outcome variable; I believe he is the only
157.
scholar in this literature to use this very logical measure.
158. A notorious example of this problem is in Ayres & Brooks, supra 131. When the authors
used their "second-choice" model to evaluate mismatch, they found that second-choice students
were significantly more likely to pass the bar on their first attempt, and more likely to take fewer
attempts to eventually pass the bar. But because they found merely a positive (and not "statistically
significant") effect of "second choice" on the probability of ever passing a bar exam, they essentially
dismissed the importance of all three results. In fact, as Williams shows in some detail in his 2011
article, and as I suggested in Reply to Critics, all three outcomes are part of a consistent and logical
pattern showing mismatch.
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expect, and whether these would be significant or not. Similarly, if variations on a given test produce coefficients that are in the predicted direction and roughly of the predicted magnitude, that is evidence in favor of
the theory, not against it.
* Robustness checks. As with any social science analysis, mismatch
analyses should be carefully vetted to insure that results are robust to
variations in formulation, so that reported results are not driven by idiosyncratic assumptions. Ayres and Brooks, for example, based their negative assessment of the mismatch effect almost entirely on an analysis that
excluded historically black law schools.159 The results change sharply
without this restriction, yet the authors neither noted this dependency on
an idiosyncratic assumption, nor provided a valid justification for excluding most "non-mismatched" blacks from their analysis.
I think the vast majority of empirical scholars would agree that solid
research should adhere to all five of these principles. But the empirical
critics of law school mismatch have neglected or ignored these principles, sometimes to a stunning degree. Daniel Ho, for example, violated a
number of these principles in his "matching" test of the mismatch hypothesis.1 60 The concept behind his test was sound: find pairs of black
students with similar characteristics who attended law schools of differing eliteness, and compare their outcomes. But in executing his test, he
compared students in adjacent (and eliteness-wise, overlapping) tiers,
rather than comparing students from elite schools with students from
very non-elite schools. His choice greatly increased the noisiness of his
analysis. He failed to acknowledge that his test was biased against finding a mismatch outcome, since he could not match on many academic
unobservable characteristics (e.g., undergraduate college) (thus ignoring
the selection bias issue). Indeed, he was unable to show whether the pairs
of students he was comparing actually experienced any difference in how
their credentials compared to their peers! He not only failed to present
results for alternative outcomes; he did not clearly explain what outcome
he was testing. Most seriously, though, he never presented results for the
most logical "matching" analysis: comparing pairs of black students
from the top BPS tiers with the bottom BPS tiers-that is, comparing
similar students who did, and did not, receive large admissions preferences. That test, as performed by Williams, shows large and highly significant mismatch effects.16 1 Those who know matching methodology
159. Ayres & Brooks, supra note 131, at 1824. Ayres & Brooks did two principal tests of the
mismatch effect in their paper, a "relative tier" test and a "second choice" test. The relative tier test
omitted historically black schools, and the "second choice" test generally produced results confirming or consistent with mismatch (tests for mismatch outcomes either showed statistically significant
mismatch effects, or showed results consistent with mismatch but not statistically significant). In
summing up, the authors discounted the second-choice results and emphasized the deeply flawed
"relative tier" results. Id. at 1838.
160.
See Ho, supra note 150, at 2002-04.
161.
See,e.g., Williams, supra note 123.
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cannot understand why Ho would have left out entirely what seems to be
the most appropriate use of his test.1 62 It is indeed hard to comprehendunless Ho's mismatch test was simply engineered to fail.
A similar disregard of some or all of these basic principles affects
the critiques of Ayres & Brooks, Barnes, Clydesdale, Lempert et al, and
Rothstein & Yoon. Some are much worse than others. Clydesdale made a
gross methodological error that invalidated most of his analysis.163
Barnes, as I have noted, made pervasive errors, perhaps in her programming, that invalidated hers. Rothstein & Yoon, in contrast, were concerned about some of these problems (e.g., "selection bias") and deployed strategies to counteract them.16 4 All of the critics, however, violated at least two of the relevant principles, and thus missed (or concealed) the decisive evidence of mismatch that flows from their models.
The great contribution Williams makes to this literature is his scrupulous concern with all five of the methodological problems I've outlined. Williams conducts several conceptually distinct tests of mismatch
effects, analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of each, and presents results of over one hundred variations on mismatch tests.16 5 He finds strong
and consistent evidence that mismatch substantially hurts the "smooth
passage" of students receiving large preferences from matriculation to
first-time bar passage; indeed, his coefficients suggest that mismatch can
entirely explain the underperformance of blacks on the bar exam, and he
shows that mismatch affects other students receiving preferences (e.g.,
Hispanics).
Table 11 provides an overview of the major empirical pieces testing
mismatch models with the BPS data. The central message of this table is
that all of the extant tests, when done appropriately, provide strong evidence of mismatch. Indeed, the question of whether mismatch is hurting
minority law students is not even a close one.

162.
Personal communication from James Lindgren, Northwestern University.
163. Clydesdale, supra note 150. Clydesdale's error is that he predicts student law school
performance without standardizing his two most important predictors (LSAT scores and undergraduate grades) for the school attended. This is like using today's temperature to predict what
month it is without controlling for one's latitude (or even whether one is in the southern or northern
hemisphere). Had the editors of Law and Social Inquiry been familiar with the data Clydesdale
used, and understood this problem in his method, it is inconceivable that the article would have been
published in anything like its current form.
164. Rothstein & Yoon, supra note 150 (unpublished manuscript).
165. Doug Williams, Do Racial Preferences Reduce Minority Learning in Law Schools?
(Working Paper 2011), availableat http://www.seaphe.org/pdf/williamsseptember.pdf.
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Table 10
An Overview of "Mismatch" Analyses Using BPS Data
Authors

Test

Ayres &
Brooks
(2005)

"Relative tier" examined how
"mismatched" students did when
compared to outcomes in tier they
would have attended
without preference

Ayres &
Brooks
(2005)

Ho
(2005)

"Second choice" examined black
students who passed
up the most elite
school that admitted
them to attend a less
elite school

"Matching" - uses
matching techniques
to compare outcomes of very similar pairs of students
attending different
law school tiers.

Design issues

(1) A&B ignored strong
evidence of Hispanic
mismatch effects in their
model;
(2) A&B omitted historically black law schools
from analysis, which
account for a majority of
non-mismatched black
students.
(2) A&B used the outcome
variable most likely not to
show mismatch: whether
graduates ever passed the
bar, and then
(2) failed to explain that
the coefficient they obtained fell within the expected range.

Ho matched students
across adjacent tiers of law
schools, even though, in
the BPS, the tiers overlap
in eliteness. Most of his
matched students therefore
attended schools virtually
identical in eliteness, and
it is not surprising that he
found non-significant
effects. A proper matching test would compare
students at least two tiers

Result when most
serious design
problems are
removed
Strong evidence of
mismatch for both
blacks and Hispanics, especially
when one considers outcomes most
relevant to the
mismatch issue.

Overpoweng
evidence that black
"second-choice"
students do better
in graduating and
passing the bar on
their first attempt;
all other "secondchoice" results
closely follow
mismatch theoty
predictions.
Matching black
students in the top
two tiers with
similar students in
the bottom two
tiers shows that
students attending
the less-elite law
schools have dramatically lower
rates of failing the
bar.

_________apart.

Yoon &
Rothstein
(2009)

"Eliteness" test:
predicts ultimate bar
passage of blacks
from individual
characteristics and
credentials, including an "eliteness"
variable to capture
whether students are
mismatched.

Yoon & Rothstein compare the two most elite
tiers with the "bottom
four" tiers; there is significant overlap in the actual
eliteness of schools in
these groups, blurring the
effects of mismatch. They
also fail to test the most
logical "mismatch" outcome - whether students
graduate and pass the bar
on their first attempt.;

When the two
middle tiers are
removed from
Yoon & Rothstein's model, or
when more appropriate mismatch
outcomes are
utilized, the model
shows strong mismatch effects.
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Authors

Test

Design issues

Yoon &
Rothstein
(2009)

"Race" test: uses
"black" as a proxy
for preferences, thus
putting in functional
form the concept I
used to illustrate
mismatch in Systemic Analysis.

Yoon & Rothstein find
significant evidence for
mismatch from this test,
though they argue it may
pick up underperformance
of blacks unrelated to
mismatch. They also argue
the effects only show up in
the bottom quintile of the
credential distribution,

Bapes
(2007)

"Open functional
form," simulating
outcomes for students at specific
credential levels at
different tiers.

Williams
(2011)

"Effect of selectivity"

Barnes's published results
were wildly incorrect, and
she reports her original
code was lost. Her "corrected" results use different outcome measures, but
in any case now finds that
if preferences were abolished, and the bottom 22%
of black applicants were
not admitted to law
school, there would be no
significant change in the
number of black lawyers.
Williams' paper is the
only one to date to carefully think through the
various empirical issues I

"Second choice"

Williams
(2011)

Williams
(2011)

_

"Instrumental vanable on choice"

[Vol. 88:4

Result when most
serious design
problems are
removed
Since 75% of
blacks in the BPS
are in the bottom
quintile of credentials, this test actually shows pervasive mismatch
effects, and the
effects become
larger when more
appropriate mismatch outcomes
are utilized.
When properly
corrected, Barnes's
original model
shows significant
mismatch effects
for students, especially blacks, with
low credentials.

Each of Williams'
tests finds strong
and consistent
support of mis-

discuss in the text; he

match, for both

considers each of these
tests to be somewhat hiased against a finding of
mismatch, but he devises
innovative alternative
measures to provide insight into how modeling
choices affect the measurement of mismatch.
Williams is also the only
analyst to include analyses
of non-black minority

blacks and minorities generally; for
the first two tests,
his estimates very
closely match the
"unexplained" gap
in black/white
outcomes.

_______
_______________groups.

Many of the results presented in this part are new, or are just entering into the circulatory system of legal scholarship. Together, perhaps
along with other important work still in the pipeline, these findings may
persuade many law professors not only that the mismatch problem is
real, but that it is sufficiently serious to overshadow the sensitivities of
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those upset by the very idea of mismatch. A unified expression of concern from a substantial number of legal scholars might well be all that is
necessary to set in motion formal inquiries, better information disclosure,
and (perhaps?) even transparency in admissions.
Yet the ideological dynamic within the legal academy may continue
to make it irresistible to ignore the mismatch problem. It is so easy for a
law school dean to behave, say, in a way similar to a school board member in a rural district where strong lobbying groups oppose the teaching
of evolution, or like a congressman in a district where grassroots constituents oppose measures to curtail global warming. "All the evidence is
not in"; "it's a theory, not a fact"; and other such platitudes provide a
comforting way of evading responsibility. The problem with these analogies, of course, is that the law school dean presides over a house of
scholars, in a place where pursuit of the truth is supposed to be paramount. And the law school dean often has direct access to evidence bearing on the mismatch problem. So analogizing the law school dean to the
rural school board member or congressman is really too kind.
The battle unfolding in California over the disclosure of the State
Bar's database highlights the sad state of debate.16 6 The State Bar has
assembled information on California bar-takers over the past thirty years
that constitutes an almost ideal database for studying the mismatch effect. It has many of the key variables that exist in the BPS, but in much
more precise form: actual schools attended by students (rather than an
imprecise "tier"), and actual scores obtained on bar exams, along with
information on pre-law school credentials and law school grades. Analyses with the State Bar data would thus not be subject to many of the analytic problems that inhere in the BPS (discussed earlier in this section),
making the demonstration of mismatch more obvious and making it possible to measure how "mismatch" varies with the size of a law school's
preference (something that is largely beyond the capacities of the BPS).
In 2006, the State Bar's psychometricians and I developed a research plan for a study using the State Bar data that would involve no
release of the Bar's internal data, but would generate invaluable insight
into the mismatch issue. The plan generated wide support among Bar
officials, until California law schools and various academic partisans in
the mismatch debate (including Dean Larry Kramer of Stanford Law
School, Professor Lempert, and the Society of American Law Teachers)
argued that such a study would be improper and might even be illegal!
The arguments were absurd-but the political power they intimated was
real, and the Bar backed down.

Bar
on the California
166. Extensive materials
http://www.seaphe.org/topic-pages/california-bar-lawsuit.php.

lawsuit

are

available

at
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Joined by advocates of greater government transparency, I then
filed a public records request with the Bar and, when again rebuffed,
filed suit in 2008, seeking a redacted version of the Bar data that would
rigorously protect the anonymity of bar-takers while preserving the analytic value of the database. In June 2011, a panel of the California Appellate Court ruled unanimously in our favor, holding that the State Bar was
subject to a common law right of access.167 The case has now been accepted for review by the California Supreme Court, 168 and already a
stream of amicus briefs is arriving at the Court, often from associations
of minority lawyers who claim any data disclosure will jeopardize their
privacy.
Even if there were genuine doubt about the existence of law school
mismatch effects-even, let us suppose, that there was only a 50/50
chance that the Bar data would confirm the mismatch problem-it is
hard to see how the actions of those seeking to bury data and kill academic inquiry are defensible. What one can see are the actions of a small,
essentially reactionary cohort, fearful of what data will show and even
more fearful of reforms to existing preference systems, invoking the
specter of an ideological attack on affirmative action to rally troops unaware, and uninterested, in the true pattern of underlying motives.
PART V. CONCLUSION

The Denver University Law Review has performed a signal service
with this symposium. The time is ripe to assess what we have learned
from past diversity efforts, and to think afresh upon how to better connect our fundamental values to the initiatives we put forth. The symposium has brought together a true diversity of perspective and many contributors with creative and thoughtful suggestions.
American higher education in general, and legal education in particular, plays a unique role in the development of national leadership. It
does not write upon a blank slate-necessarily, much of what it does is
simply recognize and certify successive cohorts of pre-packaged elites.
But higher education undoubtedly influences the shape of American
elites, and since the 1960s educational leaders have perhaps become
more self-conscious about the way they use that influence.16 9 Law
schools are thus bastions of privilege that try, in theory at least, to redefine and re-channel the sources of privilege. This is a delicate task, and it
is easy for yesterday's innovative reform to become entrenched and unaccountable.. All of the contributors to this symposium, I think, believe
that law schools should engage in a process of continual revolution from
167.
168.
169.
Reisman,

Sander v. State Bar of California, 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 330, 340 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
Sander v. State Bar of California, 2011 Cal. LEXIS 9272 (Cal. Aug. 25, 2011).
This was one of the central messages of the classic study by Christopher Jencks and David
The Academic Revolution (2d edition, 1969).
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within. We all recognize the need to challenge complacency and to remake a system that continually seeks to perpetuate and encrust itself.
For this process of ongoing rebellion to work, we must welcome
new ideas and challenges to sacred assumptions. We must question
whether what we do really works, and openly consider how new means
can better foster cherished ends. Above all we must welcome empiricism, and must be committed to the transparency that empiricism thrives
upon. Otherwise we unwittingly enshrine a dogmatic privilege under
another name.

